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Tax reform is coming, and it will be an important part of any plan to avert 
national fiscal disaster.  The President’s Fiscal Commission recently presented a 
proposal for comprehensive tax reform that will form the basis for serious legislative 
discussion.  At the center of that proposal is elimination of “tax expenditures,” which are 
provisions in the tax law that operate like direct government spending.  They include the 
charitable deduction, the home mortgage interest deduction, the exclusion for employer-
provided health insurance, the child credit, the earned income credit, education credits 
and deductions, the tax preference for retirement savings accounts like IRAs and 401(k) 
plans, and dozens of others. 
This article argues that elimination of tax expenditures is a flawed approach to 
tax reform.  Tax expenditures are not an undifferentiated mass, but reflect a wide variety 
of federal policies, each of which requires independent evaluation.  Before policymakers 
can decide whether to abolish tax expenditures, they need to know a lot more than the tax 
expenditure budgets currently reveal about what tax expenditures do, who benefits from 
them, and how much revenue could be raised by their repeal.  They also need to 
decisively identify which provisions are tax expenditures, a perennial source of 
disagreement.  This article argues that proposals to repeal tax expenditures reflect a 
normative preference for efficiency over equity, the traditional twin goals of tax policy, 
squandering the tax law’s unique role in economic justice.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A ballooning federal deficit and growing populist hostility to taxation has 
lawmakers talking seriously about tax reform.  Today’s Internal Revenue Code1 is 
dizzyingly complex, unfair, and impedes economic prosperity.  It also fails to raise 
sufficient revenue to avert fiscal disaster.2  Serious proposals for tax reform are on the 
table, and they share a simple, fundamental approach to reshaping the law: strip the Code 
of the myriad special deductions, credits and exclusions that allow individuals and 
corporations to reduce their tax liability.  Without these preferences for particular types of 
income or expenditure, taxable income and tax payments would be higher for many 
taxpayers.  These provisions, known as “tax expenditures,”3 include many provisions that 
taxpayers have become accustomed to taking for granted.  They include the charitable 
contribution deduction, the home mortgage interest deduction, the exclusion for 
employer-provided health insurance, the child credit, the earned income credit, education 
credits and deductions, and the tax preference for retirement savings accounts like IRAs 
and 401(k) plans.4   
They are called “tax expenditures” because they achieve the same objectives as 
direct federal spending, but they are administered through the tax law.  They are unlike 
“real” tax provisions that are necessary to accurately measure taxpayer income; without 
them, the tax law could still carry out its revenue collection function. Only the 
mechanism for administration distinguishes tax expenditures from direct expenditures — 
instead of the government allocating funds for particular programs, tax expenditures 
allow taxpayers to reduce their tax payments by participating in various activities.   
Tax expenditure provisions were adopted to incentivize particular activities or to 
reduce the burden on certain individuals, families or businesses.  For example, the home 
mortgage interest deduction was added to the Code in order to encourage 
homeownership.  It operates as a federal subsidy for home mortgages because the 
deduction reduces the tax liability of mortgage holders.  On account of the deduction, an 
individual’s mortgage interest burden is reduced by an amount equal to the mortgage 
holder’s interest payment multiplied by his marginal rate of tax.5   
In total, the government estimates that tax expenditures are responsible for over 
one trillion dollars of revenue loss each year.6  To help put that number in perspective, it 
                                                      
1 I.R.C. (West Supp. 2010).  
2 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4212, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE 
OPTIONS 1 (2011). 
3 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3, 88 Stat. 297, 299. This act 
mandated the preparation of a tax expenditure budget and defined tax expenditures as “revenue losses 
attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction 
from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” 
4 The list of tax expenditures also includes numerous tax preferences for businesses, such as capital 
expensing, research credits, and deferral of certain types of income. This article is primarily concerned with 
the effects of tax expenditures on individuals. 
5 To illustrate, consider a taxpayer with an annual mortgage interest payment of $20,000.  If his 
marginal rate of tax is 35%, the deduction saves him $7,000 in tax.  If the government sent him a check for 
$7,000 and increased his tax liability by $7,000, he would be in the same economic position as he is with the 
deduction.  A 20% marginal rate taxpayer would save only $4,000, but the analysis would remain the same. 
6 THOMAS HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34622, TAX EXPENDITURES AND THE FEDERAL 
BUDGET 13 (May 26, 2010) (“In 2009, it was estimated that tax expenditures amounted to about $1 
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exceeds the total amount that the federal government spends through direct discretionary 
appropriations.7 Tax expenditures not only operate to reduce tax liabilities of taxpayers, 
they sometimes entitle individuals to transfer payments through the tax administrative 
apparatus.8  Because they are the equivalent of direct spending programs, reductions in 
tax due to tax expenditures increase the size of government.9  They are essentially public 
programs that are managed by the Internal Revenue Service. This is in contrast with 
reductions in tax rates, which shrink the extent of government involvement in the private 
sector.   
Tax reform has become virtually synonymous with simplification, understood as 
(1) broadening the tax base by repealing tax expenditures, and (2) lowering the statutory 
rates.  Because they are better conceptualized as spending than taxing, reformers treat tax 
expenditures as extraneous to the fundamental purposes of the tax law: accurately 
measuring income and collecting revenue.  Two important proposals reflecting this 
fundamental idea have been released in the last few months, and they will lay the 
framework for future discussions of tax reform in Congress.10  The President’s Fiscal 
Commission, led by Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson,11 embraced the approach most 
enthusiastically: it proposed drastic reductions in the statutory rates and repeal of all tax 
expenditures in the Code.12  In fact, the Fiscal Commission’s proposed simplification was 
so sweeping that it did not identify the numerous individual tax expenditure provisions to 
be repealed, but instead erased them all with a single stroke.  It named the proposal the 
“zero plan,”13 and its main tax reform objective was elimination of all tax expenditures.  
Similarly, the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force, led by Pete 
Domenici and Alice Rivlin, followed the same basic approach of lowering rates and 
repealing tax expenditures.14  Although it does not propose to lower rates as much as the 
Fiscal Commission’s proposal, according to the Bipartisan Policy Center’s plan, cutting 
tax expenditures will finance 38% of the plan’s debt reduction by 2020.15  
                                                                                                                                                 
trillion….”); see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013 (Joint Comm. Print 2010). 
7 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012: 
HISTORICAL TABLES 167  tbl.8.7, 346 tbl.15.4 (2010). 
8 Approximately 40% of filers paid no income tax in 2009. The “refundable” credits authorize the 
government to send them checks through the tax system. See Roberton Williams, Who Pays No Income Tax, 
123 TAX NOTES 1583, 1583 (2009).   
9 Donald Marron & Eric Toder, Measuring Leviathan: How Big is the Federal Government?, 
Presentation at Loyola Law School: Starving the Hidden Beast: New Approaches to Tax Expenditure Reform 
(Jan. 14, 2011), http://events.lls.edu/taxpolicy/documents/PANEL2MarronToderSizeofGovernment-
presentationFinal01-06-11.pdf (analyzing the role of tax expenditures in measuring the size of government). 
10 See infra Part II.B for an analysis of these two plans in greater detail. 
11 It was bipartisan in that the members are associated with both Republicans and Democrats. 
12  NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 29 (2010). The proposal 
does contemplate the possibility of retaining the earned income tax credit, a child credit, and some tax 
preferences for mortgage interest, health insurance, charitable giving and retirement savings. See id. at 30. 
13 Id. at 29. 
14 BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., RESTORING AMERICA’S FUTURE 31 (2010). The recommendation 
differed importantly in proposing a value-added tax to supplement the much simplified income tax in the 
proposal. 
15 See id. at 15. Nine percent of debt reduction is projected to come from new revenues, and 54% 
from spending cuts.  Of course, if tax expenditures are treated as government spending, 92% of the total 
projected debt reduction comes from spending cuts. 
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986,16 which followed the recommendations of the 
Treasury Department’s comprehensive study, 17  exemplified this base-broadening 
conception of tax reform.  Nevertheless, in the 1986 round of reform, the middle class’s 
most beloved tax expenditures, such as the charitable deduction and the home mortgage 
interest deduction, were never seriously on the cutting block.  Today’s attack on tax 
expenditures is more radical than 1986’s because tax reform must achieve more today 
than it did in 1986, when the sole goal of tax reform was improvement in the tax law.  
Tax reform was purposely separated from deficit reduction—the parameters for the 1986 
legislation included a requirement that the new law raise the same amount of revenue as 
the prior law.  To the contrary, tax reform today is inextricably linked to deficit reduction, 
so overhauling the tax system is only partially about improving the efficiency and 
fairness of the tax law, and more prominently about addressing the country’s long-term 
fiscal challenges by increasing total revenue and reducing total expenditures.   
There are only two ways to increase revenue within the constraints of the current 
tax system’s design: broaden the base by including more in the determination of what is 
taxed, or increase rates.18  The tax base and the tax rates are the only moving parts in the 
system that we have.  The 1986 tax reform was devoted entirely to reducing rates, 
slashing them almost by half.19  The current combination tax reform/deficit reduction 
proposals reduce rates, rather than increase them to raise revenue.  Consequently, the 
reform proposals need to offer a drastic expansion of the tax base as a way to finance 
both increased revenue demands and a rate reduction.  Compared to current law, 
repealing all tax expenditures enormously expands the universe of what gets taxed.  
Without tax expenditures, there are no tax-free fringe benefits,20 no tax deferral for 
retirement savings, 21  no child credits, 22  no capital-investment expensing, 23  and no 
preferential rates for capital gains and dividends.24  All of these provisions, and many 
dozens of others, are included in the list of tax expenditures compiled by the Joint 
Committee on Taxation.25   
Other more radical proposals for tax reform discussed since 1986 have 
recommended a much broader tax base accompanied by historically low rates,26 including 
                                                      
16 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085. 
17 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, 
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, at xi (1984). There have been other excellent tax reform reports over 
the years.  See, e.g., PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH’S 2005 ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, 
FAIR AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM (2005) (proposing significant 
simplification of the tax system, and consequently, reduction of tax expenditures, but not to the extent of the 
current proposals). 
18 Beyond the constraints of the current system’s design is the introduction of new taxes, such as a 
national retail sales tax or value-added tax.  This is what the Bipartisan Policy Center has suggested. See 
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 14, at 30.  
19 The highest individual statutory rate immediately after that reform was 28%, although actual 
marginal rates were as high as 33% for some taxpayers.  Prior to the reform, the highest statutory rate was 
50%.  The highest rate today is 35%. 
20 See I.R.C. § 132 (West Supp. 2010). 
21 See I.R.C. § 401 (West Supp. 2010). 
22 See I.R.C. § 24 (West Supp. 2010). 
23 See I.R.C. § 179 (West Supp. 2010). 
24 See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006). 
25 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at 8-9 (Joint Comm. Print 2010). 
26 Compared to a generation ago, rates are historically low now.  When Congress mandated a tax 
expenditure budget in 1974, the highest marginal rate was 70%.  Marginal rates have been as high as 92%. 
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replacing the current system with some form of a consumption tax, 27 but they have never 
been enacted.  Tax returns filed on a postcard have intrigued the public imagination, and 
would leave no physical space for special deductions or credits.  Repealing tax 
expenditures is not the unique agenda of either the political left or right; rather, there is a 
call for a simpler tax system across the political spectrum.  Thus, a consensus seems to be 
developing that tax expenditures are the stumbling block preventing sensible taxation and 
are responsible for uncontrollable government spending.28  
A broad effort to rein in tax expenditures is undoubtedly a good idea.  
Nevertheless, this article advocates moderation, and argues that those who support a 
“zero plan” for tax reform have too simplistic an understanding of tax expenditures, and 
too naïve an approach to tax reform.29  First, the conception of reform that eliminates tax 
expenditures erroneously treats them as an undifferentiated mass, and ignores the 
important role that some of them play in federal policy.  Not all tax expenditures are 
giveaways to rent-seeking special interests and bad federal policy. Congress must pay as 
much attention to the purposes and effectiveness of individual tax expenditures, and 
evaluate them on a program-by-program basis, as they do in making decisions about 
whether to discontinue direct spending programs. Some tax expenditures may be worth 
their costs, if they achieve important policy goals.  As part of that critique, this article 
argues that we know precious little about what tax expenditures do and how they affect 
individuals.  The data that the government provides about tax expenditures sheds too little 
light on the issues that are important in deciding whether they are desirable elements of 
the law.  Today’s tax reform debate needs a new kind of tax expenditure budget30 that 
would better inform policymakers about the nature of the benefits that individuals obtain 
from tax expenditures, who really enjoys benefits, and who would bear the economic loss 
that would follow their repeal.   
Second, in this round of reform, revenue is central.  To that end, this article 
challenges the assumption implicit in the tax expenditure budgets about how much 
revenue would be raised if all tax expenditures were eliminated.  The revenue loss data 
that the government compiles do not sufficiently acknowledge that taxpayers would 
change their behavior to avoid paying tax, frustrating revenue-raising efforts after tax 
expenditure repeal.   
Third, any legislative effort that relies on the distinction between tax 
expenditures and structural provisions in the law is bound to get lost in the morass over 
the definition of a tax expenditure.  Ever since the term “tax expenditure” was coined, 
                                                                                                                                                 
See Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History: Income Years 1913-2010, TAX FOUNDATION (Dec. 22, 
2010), http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/fed_individual_rate_history-june2010.pdf.  
27 See, e.g., ROBERT HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX, at xiv (2nd ed. 1995); NEAL 
BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER, THE FAIRTAX BOOK 70-71 (2005). See also PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON 
FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 17, at xiv. 
28 See NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, supra note 12, at 28. 
29 Entitlement spending, particularly health-care spending, is more important to the long-term fiscal 
challenge than are tax expenditures. The Fiscal Commission acknowledged this in its report: “Federal health 
care spending represents our single largest fiscal challenge over the long-run. As the baby boomers retire and 
overall health care costs continue to grow faster than the economy, federal health spending threatens to 
balloon. Under its extended-baseline scenario, CBO projects that federal health care spending for Medicare, 
Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the health insurance exchange subsidies will 
grow from nearly 6 percent of GDP in 2010 to about 10 percent in 2035, and continue to grow thereafter.”  
See id. at 36.  
30 The tax expenditure budgets compiled currently provide revenue loss information for a list of tax 
expenditures and very limited other data.  See infra Section II.C. 
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there has been disagreement about which provisions count as tax expenditures.31  The two 
government compilers of tax expenditure budgets, the Joint Committee on Taxation and 
the Treasury Department, disagree about the provisions to include in the list. Any version 
of tax reform that relies on this distinction places more pressure on the definition than it 
can bear.  The tax expenditure budget was not designed to be the final arbiter of desirable 
law; it was meant to be an informational tool for Congress, the President, and other 
interested observers.  It is a mistake to make it the critical source for tax reform because 
as an informational tool, it lacks a normative foundation. 
Finally, this article questions the unstated normative position of the tax reform 
proposals.  While the proposals acknowledge the need for revenue and the desirability of 
improving efficiency and economic growth, the tax law’s role in promoting equity is 
largely ignored.  This is an unfortunate oversight because taxation is uniquely suited to 
promote economic justice.  Particularly where other aspects of the law aim for efficiency, 
the tax law’s role in fostering a fair distribution of wealth and income is particularly 
important. Policymakers may need to balance efficiency losses against equity gains, and 
tax expenditures that promote equity may be worth retaining despite the costs in revenue 
and economic distortion.   
The article proceeds as follows.  The next section, Part II, provides background 
that explains the relevant history of tax expenditure analysis and the recent proposals for 
reform that rely so heavily on repealing tax expenditures. Part III critiques the tax reform 
proposals in particular, and the status quo concerning tax expenditures more generally.  
The serious problems that have long been present in the tax expenditure budget are 
illuminated by the tax reform debate, but the critiques developed here about the dearth of 
information concerning tax expenditures transcend that debate.  If we are to continue 
compiling tax expenditure budgets, we need to start collecting a lot more data about who 
benefits from tax expenditures and whether they are effective in achieving their purposes.  
Part IV explains why the tax expenditure budget lacks the vigor to support tax reform, 
and Part V explores whether efficiency has overshadowed equity in the debate about tax 
expenditures and reform. The article concludes with a return to the basic principles of tax 
expenditure analysis, and considers how policymakers might use those principles in the 
tax reform process. 
II. HOW TAX EXPENDITURES BECAME THE PROBLEM 
A. Tax Expenditures and Reform Were Always Linked, but Now We Really 
Need the Money 
Tax expenditures, such as the charitable deduction and the exclusion for 
employee fringe benefits, have been part of the income tax since its earliest days, but they 
were not identified as such until 1967 when then-Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
Tax Policy, Stanley Surrey, introduced the term in a speech.32  Over the course of the 
next few years, Surrey developed the idea in a series of articles and a book, which he 
                                                      
31 See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation – Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance 
for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1979) (accelerated depreciation); Renee Judith Sobel, 
U.S. Taxation of Its Citizens Abroad, 38 VAND. L. REV. 101, 102-103 (1985) (special treatment of foreign 
earned income); Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Policy v. Revenue Policy: Qualified Plans, Tax Expenditures and 
the Flat, Plan Level Tax, 13 VA. TAX REV. 591, 592-593 (1994) (pension taxation); Douglas A. Kahn & 
Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1663-4 (1992) (lower 
rates in a progressive system, and deductions for blind and elderly). 
32 See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES, 
at vii (1973). 
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called Pathways to Tax Reform, linking tax expenditures and tax reform together in the 
minds of all observers from the beginning.  Surrey’s purpose was to reveal provisions of 
the tax law as expenditures rather than taxes, so that Congressional analysis of 
expenditure policy would also include these tax provisions.  In order to enable lawmakers 
to consider tax expenditures along with direct expenditures, a list of provisions that 
qualified as tax expenditures needed to be compiled, and in 1968, Surrey’s Treasury 
Department created the first tax expenditure budget.  A few years later, Congress 
mandated that tax expenditure budgets be prepared along with the regular budget, and it 
has since been prepared annually by both the Treasury Department as part of the 
President’s annual budget 33  and the Joint Committee on Taxation. 34   The analysis 
developed as part of the tax expenditure concept demanded that a tax provision that 
operates like a spending provision be analyzed as a spending provision, and subject to the 
same scrutiny as direct allocations.  
It is no coincidence that the concept was developed in conjunction with a 
commitment to reforming the tax law, and the tax expenditure concept was an important  
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the first major tax legislation following the 
mandated preparation of tax expenditure budgets.  Surrey was skeptical of these 
provisions, and his Treasury was opposed to using the tax law to implement social policy, 
believing that direct programs were a better alternative.35  Surrey was particularly 
concerned about the unfair effects of tax expenditures.  In Pathways for Tax Reform, he 
wrote: 
It is clear, then, that most tax incentives have decidedly adverse 
effects on equity as between taxpayers at the same income level, and 
also, with respect to the individual income tax, between taxpayers at 
different income levels.  As a consequence of these inequitable effects, 
many tax incentives look, and are, highly irrational when phrased as 
direct expenditure programs structured the same way.  Indeed, it is 
doubtful that most of our existing tax incentives would ever have been 
introduced, let alone accepted, if so structured, and many would be 
laughed out of Congress.36 
Surrey was thus concerned about both the horizontal inequity and vertical 
inequity caused by tax expenditures.  The horizontal inequity involved unfairness 
between taxpayers in the same economic position where one taxpayer could reduce tax 
by using incentive provisions and the other could not.  The vertical inequity arose from 
the treatment of taxpayers at different economic levels; higher-income taxpayers enjoyed 
greater benefits from deductions than did low-income taxpayers because the value of 
their deductions were higher on account of their higher tax rate.  This produced an 
“upside-down effect” in which higher-income taxpayers received more subsidy than 
lower-income taxpayers engaged in the same level of the same activity.37  Taxpayers too 
                                                      
33 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/analytical_perspectives. 
34 The Joint Committee prepares its tax expenditure budget as a stand-alone document. 
35 See STANLEY SURREY & PAUL MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 2 (1985). 
36 SURREY, supra note 32, at 136. 
37 For example, the mortgage interest deduction is generally available, but a taxpayer in the 35% 
bracket has an after-tax cost of only 65 cents on the dollar, while a taxpayer in the 15% bracket has an after-
tax cost of 85 cents on the dollar.  A deduction operates to reduce tax at the taxpayer’s marginal rate.  It is 
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poor to pay any tax were left out of the benefits provided through the tax system because 
they could not avail themselves of any tax incentives.38  On account of these issues, 
Surrey was quite critical of tax expenditures overall. 
Congress has, to some extent, taken Surrey’s criticisms of the design of tax 
expenditures to heart.  Under current law, there are some tax expenditures that are 
designed as credits rather than deductions.  This design addresses the “upside-down” 
effect 39  of deductions—benefitting high-income taxpayers more than low-income 
taxpayers—that concerned Surrey.  A credit reduces tax by a dollar amount so that the 
value of a credit is not dependent on one’s marginal rate of tax.  For example, the Child 
Tax Credit40 is worth $1000 to every taxpayer with a child. Some credits under current 
law also ameliorate the non-taxpayer problem that troubled Surrey, allowing individuals 
who are too poor to have any tax liability to receive government subsidy through the tax 
system.  For example, the American Opportunity Tax Credit41 provides a credit for 
college expenses that is “refundable,”42 which means that the government will send 
taxpayers checks, even if they have no tax liability.  The term “refundable” is slightly 
misleading because, in these cases, there is nothing to refund; the government simply 
funds the expenditure.  However, Congress has been quite stingy in authorizing 
refundable credits.43 
At the same time, Congress has embraced tax expenditures and increased their 
number.  The Treasury Department included 165 tax expenditure items in its 2010 list,44 
while the earliest budgets had less than a third that many.45  As a percentage of GDP, tax 
expenditures were almost 6% of GDP when the government started measuring them, and 
are now over 7%. 46  As a percentage of GDP, they declined significantly for a few years 
following the Tax Reform of 1986, but have inched up since then.47  In 2009, they 
constituted 22.5% of total federal expenditures.48  That’s a lot, considering that 46.9% of 
spending was mandatory.49  Discretionary defense spending was 14.1% and discretionary 
non-defense spending was a mere 12.5% of total spending.50 
                                                                                                                                                 
upside-down for tax expenditures intended to operate as subsidies because the low-rate taxpayer is 
presumably more needy, on account of lower income, than is the high-rate taxpayer. 
38 See SURREY, supra note 32, at 136. 
39 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 35, at 71. 
40 I.R.C. § 24 (West Supp. 2010). 
41 I.R.C. § 25A(i) (West Supp. 2009).  This provision is effective through 2012. Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 103, 124 
Stat. 3296. 
42 I.R.C. § 25A(i)(6) (West Supp. 2009). The maximum credit is $3,000, but only 40% of it is 
refundable. 
43 See infra Section III.C for a fuller discussion of refundable credits. 
44 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 303-306 (2009), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/spec.pdf. 
45 There were fifty-four in the 1972 budget prepared jointly by the Treasury Department and the 
Joint Committee on Taxation. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, 92D CONG., 
ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES 4-5 (Joint Comm. Print 1972).  
46 See HUNGERFORD, supra note 6, at 4 fig.2. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 5 fig.3. 
49 Mandatory spending includes entitlement programs like Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, 
which accounted for 29.6% of total spending in 2009.  Id. at 5.  
50 Id. at 5 fig.3. 
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These numbers illustrate why tax expenditures have become the focus of tax 
reform in a tax reform climate that is inseparable from the pressure of deficit reduction.  
Surrey’s project was successful in convincing people that tax expenditures are really 
spending programs that are placed in the tax law, so tax expenditures are an irresistible 
source of funds.  But some tax expenditures are effective and efficient spending 
programs, and alternative direct spending programs would be inferior institutional 
choices.  For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit piggybacks on the core functions of 
the tax system, delivers its benefits with little cost, and reaches more intended recipients 
than an alternative program would.  It is a program that may be more effectively 
administered through the tax system than through a direct spending program, so the Code 
may be the ideal place for that federal policy.51  If tax reform is focused on improving the 
tax law for its own sake, tax expenditures that are well designed and effectively 
implemented in the tax system are desirable.  But if tax reform is in service of revenue, 
tax expenditures become an easy target. It is not surprising that the deficit reduction/tax 
reform proposals are covetous of the 22.5% of total federal spending that has been 
loosely buried in the Code. 
B. The Current Tax Reform Proposals 
The Fiscal Commission’s proposal for tax reform is part of its larger vision to 
invest where necessary to stay competitive, maintain a national safety net, and cut all 
excess spending.52  Its overarching project was to determine how to get the national fiscal 
house in order, and deal with what it identified as the problem of a “crushing debt 
burden.”53  The Commission’s formidable goals were (1) deficit reduction, (2) reducing 
the size of the public sector,54 (3) stabilizing debt levels, (4) ensuring social security 
solvency, and (5) reducing tax rates.  The plan it presented was most ambitious, including 
discretionary spending cuts, entitlement reform, and budget process reform, in addition to 
tax reform.   
The Commission’s plan was quite specific in some of its recommendations.  For 
example, in its proposal to cut discretionary federal spending, it suggested reducing 
federal travel budgets and freezing the pay of members of Congress.55  In its treatment of 
health-care savings, it proposed a specific reform of the Medicare cost-sharing rules and 
cuts in payments to hospitals for medical education.56  It also included recommendations 
about payments to states for abandoned mines and FCC spectrum auctions—pretty 
detailed stuff for such a big report.57  But in other ways, the recommendations were quite 
vague, such as suggesting honest budgeting for catastrophes, and requiring the President 
to propose annual limits on war spending.58   
The recommendations for tax reform were somewhat inconsistent with the goals 
of the project overall.  The first goal for tax reform was “sharply reduc[ing] tax rates,”59 
even though lower tax rates make it harder to raise the revenue required to address the 
                                                      
51 See David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 
YALE L.J. 955, 961 (2004). 
52 NAT’L COMM. ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, supra note 12, at 12. 
53 Id. at 6. 
54 The report proposes to cap revenue at 21% of GDP and bring spending to that level.  Id. at 14.  In 
2010, outlays were at 23.8% of GDP. Id. at 16.  But revenues were only 15%. Id. at 10. 
55 Id. at 26. 
56 Id. at 37-38. 
57 Id. at 46. 
58 Id. at 22-23. 
59 Id. at 14. 
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current debt burden and reduce the deficit that we face.  The report acknowledges that 
more revenue and less spending are both necessary parts of a responsible fiscal plan.  
However, reducing rates narrows the policy choices for increasing revenue–the only 
place to find increased revenue (without introducing other taxes) is in including more in 
the tax base.  Consequently, the report recommends broadening the tax base. 60  
Unfortunately, the pressure placed on the base is extraordinary when the objectives 
include both lowering rates and raising significant amounts of revenue.  This explains 
why the Commission’s recommendation starts by proposing the repeal of all tax 
expenditures in the Code;61 the broader the base, the more revenue collected.  Without 
any tax expenditures, the Fiscal Commission concluded that rates could be 8%, 14%, and 
23%, and still raise $80 billion for deficit reduction.62  That represents a very substantial 
rate cut compared to the current law rates of 10%, 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35%.63 
The report failed to explain how it determined the amount of revenue that the 
broader tax base raises, and the Commission may be too optimistic about how much 
revenue the government can raise solely from base broadening.  Tax expenditures are 
incentives.  If they successfully encourage taxpayers to do things they would not 
otherwise do, then they are effective incentives.  If they are, we might expect that 
removal of an incentive would discourage a taxpayer from continuing the behavior that 
was previously encouraged.  Consider, for example, the charitable contribution 
deduction.  It may encourage taxpayers to give to charity.  A taxpayer in the 35% bracket 
who donates $100 to charity saves $35 in taxes.  The tax expenditure budget includes that 
$35 as revenue loss to the federal treasury because the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
defined tax expenditures as “revenue losses.”64  However, the tax expenditure budget 
itself makes clear that the estimates of revenue loss included in the budget would “not 
necessarily equal the increase in Federal revenues (or the change in the budget balance) 
that would result from repealing these special provisions.”65  If that is the case, then it is 
important to know how the Fiscal Commission determined the amount of revenue that 
would be increased on account of tax expenditure repeal.  The actual revenue raised 
could be much less than projected, depending on the effectiveness of the incentives and 
the post-reform rates.  John Buckley recently suggested that “[individual] tax expenditure 
estimates grossly overstate the potential revenue” associated with their repeal, while 
corporate tax expenditure estimates may underestimate the revenue that could be raised 
by their repeal.66 
In addition, the proposal to repeal all tax expenditures is inconsistent with the 
Commission’s more nuanced approach to discretionary spending.  Discretionary spending 
and tax expenditures are policy alternatives.  As Surrey pointed out, tax expenditures are 
not part of the “structural provisions necessary to implement the income tax” but are 
“Governmental financial assistance programs carried out through special tax provisions 
rather than through direct Government expenditures.”67  While the Fiscal Commission 
explicitly supported investments in education, infrastructure, and research and 
                                                      
60 Id. at 28. 
61 Id. at 29. 
62 Id. at 29-30. 
63  I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 2008). 
64 See supra note 3. 
65 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 44, at 298. 
66 John L. Buckley, Tax Expenditure Reform: Some Common Misconceptions, 132 TAX NOTES 
255, 259 (2011). 
67 SURREY, supra note 32, at 6. 
12 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:1 
development,68 it failed to notice that this type of investment is subsidized through tax 
expenditures that the plan would repeal.69  
The Fiscal Commission offered an “illustrative” tax reform plan that would retain 
a few tax expenditures and finance them with rates of 12%, 22% and 28%.  The plan 
would retain the earned income tax credit and the child tax credit as they are under 
current law, and pared down tax expenditures for mortgage interest, charitable giving, 
employer-provided health insurance, and retirement savings.  These retentions follow the 
Commission’s stated principle to protect the truly disadvantaged;70 the earned income tax 
credit operates to increase the take-home pay of low-income taxpayers who work.  
However, it is not clear how the other retained tax expenditures further the Commission’s 
central goals.  The exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is the single most 
costly tax expenditure, so its repeal would contribute significantly to revenue.71  While 
this article demurs in endorsing specific tax expenditures, it offers a process for analyzing 
which to retain by emphasizing incidence and equity. 
The Bipartisan Policy Center’s report is quite similar to the Fiscal Commission’s.  
Like the Fiscal Commission, the Bipartisan Policy Center considered restraining the 
federal debt as the major challenge to be addressed.72  Its mission was equally ambitious, 
balancing the budget, fixing social security, addressing rising healthcare costs, and 
containing discretionary spending.  Its tax reform proposal resembles the Fiscal 
Commission’s in many ways.  Most important for purposes of this article, the cornerstone 
of its tax reform is repeal of almost all tax expenditures.  The report blames tax 
expenditures for excessive complexity, reducing productivity, making the tax system 
unfair, and encouraging fraud.73  Its tax reform plan sets rates at 15% and 27%, somewhat 
higher than the zero option plan, but in the range of the Fiscal Commission’s illustrative 
plan.  Like the illustrative plan, it also retains income support for low-income taxpayers, 
pared down benefits for home mortgages, charitable contributions, and retirement 
savings, and taxes capital gains and dividends at ordinary rates.74 
Some elements of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s plan are innovative.  For 
example, the subsidy for charitable contributions would be paid directly to charities, 
rather than to taxpayers, as under current law.75  This approach would provide a federal 
subsidy for all charitable giving, unlike current law, which requires taxpayers to itemize 
deductions (instead of claiming the standard deduction) in order to claim charitable 
contribution deductions.76  The Bipartisan Policy Center plan would repeal the standard 
deduction and the personal exemptions, but in their place, it would provide an earnings 
                                                      
68 NAT’L COMM. ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, supra note 12, at 12. 
69 For example, education subsidies are in various provisions of the Code.  See I.R.C. § 25A (West 
Supp. 2010); I.R.C. § 117 (2006); I.R.C. § 221 (2006); I.R.C. § 222 (West Supp. 2010); I.R.C. § 529 (West 
Supp. 2009); I.R.C. § 530 (West Supp. 2008).  There is a tax credit for research and development.  See I.R.C. 
§ 41 (West Supp. 2010). 
70 NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, supra note 12, at 12. 
71 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 33, at 252.  That tax expenditure alone is projected 
to cost over a trillion dollars over the five-year budget window in the most recent estimate, 2012-16. 
72 See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 14, at 2. 
73 See id. at 31. 
74 Id. at 128.  The report includes a complete list of all tax expenditures that would be retained.  Id. 
at 130. 
75 Id. at 34.  
76 It would not, however, solve the problem of capture of the benefit by donors. See infra Part 
III.A.3.  
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credit for all wage earners77 that would prevent a low-income taxpayer from owing tax on 
his first dollar of earnings.  Most importantly, the plan proposes that a new “Debt 
Reduction Sales Tax” be adopted to raise revenue.78  Its design closely resembles the 
value added taxes currently in use in all OECD countries, and would be imposed at a rate 
of 6.5% starting in 2013.  While the report is highly critical of tax expenditures, the 
DRST alleviates some of the pressure on tax expenditures to do all the work. 
The Bipartisan Policy Center presented its plan as a combination of spending 
cuts, tax expenditure cuts, and new revenues.  A chart included in the report appears to 
show that approximately half the money comes from the spending side and half the 
money comes from the tax side.  In 2020, 9% of the debt reduction is from new revenues 
(offset by rate cuts), 38% is from tax expenditure cuts, and 54% is from spending cuts.79  
However, clear understanding of tax expenditures makes it apparent that only 9% is 
really from new sources of revenue and the rest is from cuts in spending, whether from 
the discretionary side of the direct budget or the tax expenditure side of the tax system.  It 
is important to know whether the revenue comes from cutting programs or from raising 
taxes because the individuals affected are likely to be different.  The recent Congressional 
insistence on reducing spending, but not raising taxes, as a condition to raising the debt 
ceiling, severely limited the government’s choice for sources of funds, and will require 
significant cuts to government programs.80  But there seems to be an insurmountable 
political opposition to tax increases.81 
The Fiscal Commission’s tax reform plan included the goal of maintaining or 
increasing progressivity.82  In order to achieve that goal, while also reducing rates, capital 
gains and dividends would have to be taxed at ordinary rates, which the illustrative plan 
does.83  Retention of the earned income tax credit is also imperative in the proposed tax 
reform to conform with the Commission’s distributional goals.  The Bipartisan Policy 
Center did not include progressivity as one of its prime objectives, but it did state, in its 
summary of recommendations, that its proposed reforms would make the tax system 
more progressive,84 and its plan also taxes capital gains and dividends at the same rate as 
ordinary income.  The Tax Policy Center has done a distributional analysis of both plans, 
under various baselines and with a variety of statutory reforms.85  Compared to current 
policy, the Fiscal Commission’s plan reduces after-tax income at every income level,86 
but the share of federal taxes goes down slightly for higher income taxpayers and goes up 
                                                      
77 BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 14, at 35. 
78 Id. at 38-39. 
79 Id. at 15. 
80 Congressional Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 251(b)(2)(A), 125 Stat. 239, 
241 (2011). This act committed to reducing the federal deficit by $2.1 trillion over 10 years, but much of the 
detail is left to be determined by a joint congressional committee. 
81 See, e.g., Editorial, Ideology Trumps Economics, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2011, at A22.  
82 NAT’L COMM. ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, supra note 12, at 28. 
83 Id. at 31.  The Joint Committee and the Treasury disagree about whether the preferential rate for 
capital gains and dividends is a tax expenditure.  The Joint Committee includes it in its list, but the Treasury 
does not on the grounds that the preferential rates are offset by the double taxation of corporate income. 
84 BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 14, at 17. 
85 See TAX POL’Y CTR., DEFICIT REDUCTION PROPOSALS (2010), available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Deficit-Reduction-Proposals.cfm. 
86 See TAX POL’Y CTR., “CHAIRMEN’S MARK” OPTION 1: THE ZERO PLAN VARIANT RETAINING THE 
CHILD TAX CREDIT AND EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT TABLE T10-0252 (2010), available at  
http://taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T10-0252.pdf. 
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for lower income taxpayers.87  This is a reduction in progressivity as measured by one of 
the standard definitions under which progressivity increases only if tax shares for higher 
income taxpayers increase. 88   An alternative approach to measuring changes in 
progressivity looks at relative changes in after-tax income, rather than tax shares.89  
According to the distributional tables prepared by the Tax Policy Center, after-tax income 
goes down for everyone, but in a somewhat inconsistent way, with the fourth (second 
highest) quintile seeing the smallest percentage reduction.90  The Bipartisan Policy 
Center’s proposal appears to be more progressive than the Fiscal Commission’s.  Only 
the top quintile would see an increase in its percentage share of federal taxes paid under 
their proposal.91  Additionally, after tax-income would not be reduced at all for the 
bottom quintile, but would be reduced by an increasing proportion in each quintile as 
income goes up, increasing progressivity compared to the baseline.92  
C. Tax Expenditures and Budget Policy 
The approach to tax reform that repeals all (or almost all) tax expenditures in the 
name of deficit reduction is consistent with the traditional approach to the tax expenditure 
budget—as a tool of budget policy.  Repealing all tax expenditures helps achieve the 
goals of those concerned that tax expenditures are an invisible, illegitimate, and 
unchecked hemorrhaging of federal funds.  It treats tax expenditures as a source of funds 
to be garnered for proper federal goals. 
This was the way that Surrey imagined the tax expenditure budget would 
function when he first advocated it, 93 and the budget itself reflects that approach.  The 
design of the tax expenditure budget mimics that of the larger federal budget, organized 
by administrative function, and detailing revenue loss on account of each item.94  It 
allows tax benefits to be readily compared to direct spending.  Congress can study the 
budgets, evaluate the efficacy of the spending, and decide when to replace a tax provision 
with a direct spending provision or repeal it altogether.  Tax expenditure analysis—the 
                                                      
87 See id. The tables do not explain their results, but the overall effect of the changes is complex, 
with reduced rates offsetting greater income inclusion.  The Tax Policy Center did not run distributional 
analyses for the most extreme version of reform presented in the report, the pure zero option.  However, the 
Tax Policy Center’s analysis shows variations depending on the treatment of payroll taxes, in addition to 
income taxes.  See TAX POL’Y CTR., FINAL REPORT’S “ILLUSTRATIVE TAX REFORM PLAN” (2010), available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Fiscal_Commission_Table_Guide.cfm. 
88 See Martin Sullivan, How to Read Tax Distribution Tables, 90 TAX NOTES 1747, 1749 (2001) 
(describing distributionally neutral tax cuts as proportionate to tax burden). 
89 William Gale & Peter Orszag, Bush Administration Tax Policy: Distributional Effects, 104 TAX 
NOTES 1559, 1560 (2004) (describing a distributionally neutral change as one that gives everyone the same 
percentage change in take-home income). 
90 See TAX POL’Y CTR., supra note 86. 
91 Tax Pol’y Ctr., BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER TAX REFORM PLAN AGAINST CURRENT POLICY 
BASELINE, TABLE T10-0249 (2010), available at http://taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T10-
0249.pdf. 
92 See id. 
93 See Stanley Surrey & Paul McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act 
of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV 679, 679 (1976) (“[T]ax subsidies constitute a form of government 
spending and thus are essentially linked to the methods of government spending traditionally covered in 
budget documents.”). 
94 Both the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Treasury Department follow this design.  Thus, 
the budget includes a heading, for example, of “national defense” and lists therein the tax expenditures for 
national defense and the estimated revenue cost of each specific provision.  The Treasury also includes a list 
of the largest tax expenditures, in descending order, which is a more useful organization for those interested 
in tax reform.   
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exercise of evaluating a tax program by reference to spending goals—was intended to be 
the mechanism by which policymakers could decide whether a tax-based spending 
program was desirable.95  Inclusion in the list of tax expenditures provided the signal that 
a provision required scrutiny as spending.  Surrey clearly expected that application of tax 
expenditure analysis to many provisions included in the list would lead policymakers to 
decide that the provision was not an appropriate way to spend federal funds.96  As a 
matter of budget policy, the challenge presented by tax expenditure analysis was to 
justify individual provisions of the Code as legitimate spending of federal funds.   
The initial roadblock to the budget-policy approach was convincing people that 
these provisions should be analyzed the same way as direct spending, rather than as 
simple tax reductions.97  Eventually, the equivalence between tax expenditures and direct 
spending became widely accepted, and the debate shifted to how tax expenditures should 
be integrated into budget policy—who should decide about tax-based spending, and the 
level of review to which tax expenditures should be regularly subjected.98  Unfortunately, 
the vision for integrating tax expenditure review into the budget process never came to 
pass in any substantial way, and the proliferation of tax expenditures is a by-product of 
that failure.  Instead of fostering cooperation between the substantive Congressional 
committees and the tax-writing committees, the tax-writing committees have become “a 
Congress within the Congress,”99 legislating on all matters of federal policy and spending 
federal funds without coordinating with appropriating committees.   
From the perspective of budget policy, tax expenditure analysis has been a 
complete failure, and wiping the slate clean seems like an appropriate response.  
Wholesale repeal is a quick and effective way to remove the power of the tax-writing 
committees over federal spending—it effectively returns power to the substantive 
committees over their areas of expertise.  But it is not a permanent solution standing 
alone.  While repeal slows down the work of the tax committees, without significant 
legislative change governing the procedures for adopting and reviewing tax expenditures, 
the tax committees can be expected to return to their old ways.100  From a budget policy 
perspective, the new provisions adopted might better reflect current priorities, and the 
overall gains might be worthwhile, but repeal might simply create new opportunities for 
lobbyists and the legislators who love them.101 
                                                      
95 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 35, at 99-117. 
96 See SURREY, supra note 32, at 234-35 (discussing the upside-down subsidy of the home-
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97 Even the Treasury Department was skeptical a decade after Surrey’s introduction of it. See 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
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Contrary to the views of those concerned that tax expenditures undermine budget 
policy, this article takes the position that tax expenditures are more important in tax 
policy than in budget policy.  Specifically, tax expenditures can and must play a key role 
in affecting the distribution of the benefits and burdens of government.102  Achieving 
distributional fairness was long thought to be a central normative function of tax 
policy,103 and tax expenditures play an important part in the fairness of the tax system 
overall.  Even if there were complete consensus on the exact amount of revenue to be 
raised from the tax system, there would still be a lively tax policy discussion about where 
that revenue should come from.  Tax policy is important because it contains the 
discussion about who pays; it reflects our judgments about who is entitled to the rewards 
of society and how much individuals owe one another.  Consequently, it is troubling that 
the current discussion of tax reform pays virtually no attention to how the tax 
expenditures that are primed for repeal affect the distribution of the tax burden or the 
benefits from government.  The call for repeal of tax expenditures is driven primarily by 
efficiency and increasing simplicity.104  
From the perspective of distributive justice, tax expenditures are an important 
component in the institutional structure of government levies and outlays.  Tax 
expenditures provide an important bridge between the distributional analysis of taxes and 
the distributional analysis of spending.  From this perspective, any proposal to summarily 
repeal all tax expenditures is unintelligible because it fails to acknowledge that the 
distributional effects of tax expenditures are not simply a by-product of budget policy, 
but part of their purpose.105  Shifting the tax reform debate to questions of equity will be 
difficult because equity in taxation is often treated as an underappreciated value.  Because 
of that, we currently lack the basic tools to measure the distributional effects of the tax 
system.   
If tax expenditures are to be the major focus of tax reform—as they seem to be—
it is imperative that policymakers better understand what tax expenditures do and for 
whom.  The distributional effects of tax expenditures are not part of the tax reform debate 
because the issues that we treat as relevant to tax reform have ignored the question of 
who really benefits from tax expenditures.  But before Congress simply repeals all tax 
expenditures, it must identify the winners and losers from each and every one.  It must 
also evaluate the effects of each provision relative to its purpose to determine whether a 
provision is effective in carrying out a desirable federal policy.  Evaluation on these 
grounds is necessary for deliberative decision making about tax expenditures.  Revenue 
effects are important, but they are only one piece of the tax reform analysis.  With the 
information available today, it is impossible to make any intelligent decision about 
repealing tax expenditures.   
                                                      
102 This is the issue for distributive justice as understood by liberal political theory.  See generally 
Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229 (2011). 
103 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 917-24 (Batoche Books 2001) 
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104 See David Kocieniewski, I.R.S. Watchdog Calls for Tax Code Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
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105 The Fiscal Commission’s “zero plan” eliminates all tax expenditures, including the earned 
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III. WHO REALLY BENEFITS FROM TAX EXPENDITURES? 
We need to know a lot more about tax expenditures before deciding whether it’s 
a good idea to eliminate them.  The distributional effects of tax expenditures have not 
been part of the tax reform debate because the issues that we treat as relevant to tax 
reform—revenue, economic growth, and efficiency—ignore the question of who benefits 
from tax expenditures.  It is time to change that and take the role of tax expenditures in 
the distribution of government benefits and burdens more seriously.  Tax expenditures 
have become indispensible to understanding federal policy, but their distributional 
analysis has not improved, despite their increasing importance to public spending.   
Public fairness depends on both taxing and spending because it is the sum total of 
these government activities that define the relationship of individual contributions and 
public entitlements.  Similarly, the level of effective progressivity depends on income 
shares, tax shares, and public benefit shares.106  Tax expenditures are equivalent to both 
government spending programs and reductions in taxes that individuals owe, so they are 
relevant to both parts of the necessary inquiry into overall public fairness.  To measure 
the real total level of progressivity, both government benefits and tax burdens must be 
taken into account, and changes to current law must be evaluated by measuring the 
consequences to individuals of tax cuts or increases as well as changes in public benefits 
of every type.  
A. We Are Ignorant About Who Really Benefits from Tax Expenditures 
1. Where Are the Distributional Tables? 
Distributional tables present data about households in different income groups.  
They may show the effective rate of tax applicable to households at different income 
levels or the percentage share of total tax payments made by households in different 
categories.  More narrowly, they may show how many households at different income 
levels claim the standard deduction or the dollars claimed as deductions for mortgage 
interest or charitable contributions. Distributional tables are often organized by quintile, 
so that 20% of all households are aggregated, and data about their tax liability displayed.  
The Tax Policy Center’s analysis of the tax reform proposals107 breaks out the highest 
quintile into smaller categories because the top 1% is a very different population from the 
top 20%; data about the top 20% might not present an accurate picture of the situation for 
the very top earners.  Distribution tables are important because they show how the law 
affects taxpayers at different points along the income spectrum, and consequently how 
progressive aspects of the system are.   
Distributional tables for tax expenditures could show various things.  The 
purpose of distributional tables for tax expenditures would be to indicate how much 
taxpayers in different income classes claim in tax expenditure benefits.  Most simply, 
distributional tables could show the dollar value of deductions, exclusions, and other 
preferences claimed by taxpayers in different income classes.  Alternatively, they could 
indicate the relative shares of total deductions, exclusions or other preferences, the 
relationship of total income to tax expenditures claimed, or any other data that might be 
relevant when comparing how the tax system affects taxpayers at different income levels. 
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The Treasury version of the tax expenditure budget provides no distributional 
data, and the Joint Committee’s report includes data on only a handful of provisions.  The 
most comprehensive recent analysis of individual income tax expenditures concluded that 
all income groups benefit from tax expenditures.108  High-income taxpayers benefit more 
than low-income taxpayers in both dollar amounts and as a percentage of their income.109  
However, low-income taxpayers benefit more in relation to the taxes they pay.110 The 
study, conducted by the Tax Policy Center, provided significantly more information than 
any government source, but still did not include business tax expenditures, which would 
have increased the distribution of benefits to high-income taxpayers.111 
 The government was more forthcoming with distributional data in the early tax 
expenditure budgets than it is today.  In the first budget, prepared jointly by the Joint 
Committee and the Treasury, there were forty-three distributional estimates included in 
the presentation.  The next budget included forty-five items in the distributional tables.  
In 1975, the Joint Committee/Treasury included no distribution numbers, apparently 
because the drafters of the report had insufficient time to compile them.112  But a few 
months later, the 1976 compendium prepared for the Senate Budget Committee included 
fifty distribution tables.113  Distributional data was provided for virtually all of the 
individual provisions included in the tax expenditure budget; corporate provisions were 
excluded to avoid making assumptions about which individuals to assign the benefits in 
the corporate tax.114  Although these early budgets included distribution data for so many 
items, the informational value of that data was somewhat limited because the reports did 
not include income distribution data that would help to evaluate the data provided on the 
tax expenditures.  The data included the total revenue loss to taxpayers in different 
income classes as well as the percentage of taxable returns in each income class, but it 
did not include the total income in each class or nontaxable returns.115  Total revenue loss 
is not an accurate measure of benefit.116  Nevertheless, it is clear from the early budgets 
that high-income taxpayers disproportionally benefited from tax expenditures, and tax 
expenditures connected to investment income were more skewed to high-income 
taxpayers than other tax expenditure provisions.117  According to the Tax Policy Center 
study, it is still true that investment preferences are most beneficial to high-income 
taxpayers.118  For 2007, the preferential rates on capital gains and dividends were enjoyed 
by the “top 1 percent of taxpayers and provide[d] little income gain for anyone else.”119 
                                                      
108 Leonard Burman, Christopher Geissler & Eric Toder, How Big Are Total Individual Income Tax 
Expenditures and Who Benefits from Them?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 82 (2008) (analyzing 2007 data). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 79, 80 n.2. 
112 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 94TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 5-6 
(Joint Comm. Print 1975). 
113 STAFF OF S. BUDGET COMM., 94TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND 
MATERIAL AND INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 4 (Comm. Print 1976). 
114  Id. 
115 Unlike today, in those years, the Tax Policy Center did not supplement the government’s data 
with additional distribution tables.   
116 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 103D CONG., METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING 
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS 3 (Joint Comm. Print 1993). 
117 See id. 
118 Burman et al., supra note 108, at 79-80. 
119 Id. at 82. 
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 The Joint Committee has long included about a dozen distribution tables in its 
analysis.120  But the items that are included in the recent tables and appear most favorable 
to the rich, such as the mortgage interest deduction, are not the ones that appeared most 
favorable to the rich in the early budgets.  In 1981, consistent with the Tax Policy 
Center’s analysis for 2007, the Joint Committee’s analysis showed that the preference for 
capital gains provided an enormous benefit for high-income taxpayers.121  The most 
recent budget included no distribution table for any investment-related tax expenditure,122 
and the Treasury no longer treats the preference for capital gains as a tax expenditure.123  
The Joint Committee’s choice to include distribution tables for more social-policy 
flavored tax expenditures, but not for investment preferences, clearly skews the 
distribution tables so that current tax expenditures appear more favorable to lower-
income taxpayers than is warranted. A more extensive distributional analysis of 
investment provisions would provide a more balanced impression of the distribution of 
tax expenditures overall.  A more detailed set of information would be helpful to 
policymakers in evaluating who benefits from tax expenditures.  In addition, an 
integrated distributional analysis of taxes and spending would give a more complete 
picture of the benefits and burdens of government.124 
2. The Real Incidence of Tax Benefits Matters 
While distributional tables are helpful, they can also be misleading because they 
measure dollars claimed on tax returns.  The person who reduces her tax on account of a 
tax expenditure provision may not actually be any better off than she would have been 
without the tax expenditure.  We need to know the real incidence of the benefits — who 
is actually made better off on account of the tax provision. There are no distributional 
tables prepared by anyone that provides this information, but it is crucial to understanding 
the true effect of tax expenditures on individuals. 
Consider this example.  The tax law might allow a deduction for installing 
energy-saving windows. Such a provision would constitute a tax expenditure.  Assume 
that prior to such a deduction being adopted into law, energy saving windows cost $1,000 
                                                      
120 In 1981, there were 12 provisions in the tables, and in 2010, there were still 12. See infra notes 
121-122.  
121 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 97TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 1981-1986, at 19 (Joint Comm. Print 1981). 
122 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at 49-54 (Joint Comm. Print 2010).  The items included in the 2010 
distribution tables are: medical deduction, real estate tax deduction, SALT deduction, charitable deduction, 
child care credit, EITC, Social Security exclusion, child credit, education credits, student loan interest 
deduction, mortgage interest deduction, and the negative tax expenditure for phase out of the personal 
exemption.   
123 In 2004, the Treasury stopped treating the preferential rates for capital gains and dividend as tax 
expenditures, even though they had been designated that way since the first budget was prepared in 1972 (in 
fact, in the first budget, the capital gains preference was the largest single item).  In changing the treatment, 
the administration explained that the double taxation of corporate income under a system with a separate 
corporate tax was being offset by the reduced taxation of capital gains and dividends, making the preference 
an integral part of that structure, rather than a tax expenditure that provided a special rate for income from 
particular sources.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 138-39 (2003), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy04/browse.html. 
124 The Joint Committee never models the effects of spending programs.  See STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAX’N, 103D CONG., METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
TAX BURDENS 40 (Joint Comm. Print 1993).  See also Gale & Orzsag, supra note 89 (arguing that 
progressivity can only be measured with both taxes and spending). 
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each.  Enactment of the deduction should encourage people to buy energy-saving 
windows.  An individual in the 35% bracket bears an after-tax cost of only $650 for a 
$1,000 window because she can reduce her tax liability by $350 by buying it.  In this 
example, the taxpayer enjoys both the nominal (statutory) incidence and real (economic) 
incidence because she claims the deduction on her return and is really $350 better off on 
account of it.  But the price of windows might rise on account of the deduction.  If the 
price rises to $1,100, then the taxpayer saves $385 on account of the deduction.  But she 
is not $385 better off because she had to pay $100 more for the window.  The producer of 
the window enjoys that $100 benefit and the purchaser’s benefit is only $285.  The 
nominal incidence is all on the purchaser, but the real incidence in this example is split 
between the producer and the consumer. 
In its recent comprehensive review of tax expenditures, the Joint Committee 
claimed that the principal utility of tax expenditure analysis “appears to have been as a 
tool of tax policy and tax distributional analysis.”125  The tax expenditure budget is an 
informational tool, but it fails to provide the relevant information necessary to decide 
whether a provision should be repealed because real incidence is essential information.  
The tax expenditure budget is unlikely to become an effective tool of tax distributional 
analysis without incidence data about all tax expenditures.  In the early reports, when the 
distributional tables were most extensive, the provisions that were excluded from the 
tables were those with indeterminate incidence; the staff did not want to make 
assumptions about the individuals who would have paid the tax if a business incentive 
was repealed.126  Similarly in the recent distributional analysis by the Tax Policy Center, 
business and investment-related tax expenditures, whose beneficiaries may be hard to 
identify because the nominal taxpayer may not be the beneficiary, were excluded from 
the analysis.127  
In 1993, the Joint Committee undertook a project to better present accurate 
distributional data and produced a report, but the tax expenditure budgets have not 
followed through on the ideas presented there and the empirical work does not seem to 
have been attempted.128  The distributional data in the Joint Committee’s budget follows 
the revenue cost model of the tax expenditure budget.  But loss of economic well-being is 
not the same as revenue collected from tax.129  Better distributional data that measures 
real costs and benefits to people will make the tax expenditure budget more relevant to 
the core concerns of tax policy.  Information about who benefits from a tax expenditure 
should be considered at least as important as information about how much revenue might 
be raised on a provision’s repeal.  Unfortunately, only the latter information is available 
in the government data. 
 From a distributional perspective, we have to understand both what we are 
spending on, and who benefits from that spending.130  These are two separate pieces of 
information, and the tax expenditure budget would ideally provide both, even where the 
                                                      
125 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE 
ANALYSIS 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2008). 
126 See S. BUDGET COMM., 94TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND 
MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 4 (Comm. Print 1976). 
127 See Burman, et al., supra note 108. 
128 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 103D CONG., METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING 
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS (Joint Comm. Print 1993).  
129 Id. at 26. 
130 This is what Daniel Shaviro’s proposed methodology tries to do.  See Daniel Shaviro, 
Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187 (2004). 
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analysis is more complex than the hypothetical windows in the simple example above.  
Take the classic tax expenditure example of the exclusion for interest on municipal 
bonds.  The tax expenditure budget treats this exclusion as a tax expenditure because 
interest income is generally included in taxable income; § 103 is an exception to that 
rule.131  But it would be a mistake to assume that the benefit in the budget goes to the 
holders of the bonds who are not required to include the interest.  The exclusion was 
adopted to provide a subsidy for state and local governments.  The reduced interest rate 
paid by municipalities is an implicit tax on holders.  If the entire exclusion were a transfer 
from the federal government to the states, then holders would get no real benefit from 
owning municipal bonds, and policymakers might want to maximize that benefit.  
However, for tax-exempt bonds, it is well known that the benefit does not flow entirely to 
issuers because issuers need to pay a premium rate of interest in order to attract sufficient 
purchasers.132  It also flows to high-bracket taxpayers who receive a windfall interest rate 
from municipal bonds compared to the after-tax rate of taxable bonds of equal risk.133  
The real policy issue in the § 103 exemption is not the exclusion for the interest earned 
by all the taxpayers receiving it, but the benefit to states and windfalls to high-rate 
holders.  The tax expenditure budget could provide more useful information if it 
quantified these benefits, which policymakers could consider in designing the provision 
and deciding whether it should be retained in the tax law.  
We make the mistake of believing that the individuals who benefit from a tax 
expenditure are the ones who would pay tax if the provision did not exist.  It follows from 
the way that the tax expenditure budget measures revenue loss: by considering how much 
the nominal taxpayer would owe if not for the provision.  But this is a mistake. Revenue 
losses attributable to particular taxpayers do not imply that those taxpayers actually 
receive windfall benefits.  Consider the exclusion for employer-provided health 
insurance.  Because of its enormous revenue cost, it must be on the table in discussions of 
tax reform, and it is already scheduled to be pared down—though not eliminated—under 
the health care reform legislation adopted last year.134  Workers do not pay tax on the 
value of health benefits their employers give them.  The revenue-cost approach treats this 
tax expenditure as a benefit to workers.  But it might not really make workers better off 
because tax-free fringe benefits allow employers to pay their workers less money, and 
workers may not value the benefits as much as they cost.135  The exclusion’s repeal might 
                                                      
131 The Reconsideration report treats it as an exception to the Code’s general rules and the 
traditional tax expenditure budget treats it as an exception from the normal tax, but the result is the same.  See 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2008-2012, at 16 (Joint Comm. Print 2008).  This was the only budget prepared applying the 
methodology introduced in the Reconsideration report. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., 
A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2008). 
132 For example, if corporate bonds pay 10%, then municipal bonds of equal risk should pay 6.5% if 
they are marketed to 35% rate holders.  In fact, municipalities generally have to pay somewhat more than 
6.5% in order to attract sufficient buyers, making 35% rate holders prefer municipal bonds to equivalent 
corporate bonds solely for tax reasons. 
133 See Boris Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out 
Inequities? 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 744 (1979). 
134 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9001(a), 124 Stat. 119, 848-
54 (2010). 
135 For example, $100 of health insurance is worth more than $100 cash wages on account of the 
exclusion.  A worker in the 15% bracket only has $85 cash after paying tax on the cash, but still has $100 of 
insurance.  But employers know this and may reduce the fringe benefit by the tax savings so that workers 
only get $85 in health insurance.  The benefit of the exclusion goes to the employers, who are able to save 
22 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:1 
only impose transition losses on workers, depending on how wages would adjust to the 
repeal.  The exclusion might actually benefit employers more than employees, so 
employers might be the losers if the tax benefit is removed.  With the tax expenditure 
provision, employees receive the benefits tax-free, but employers can pay less in wages 
on account of the exclusion.  If the exclusion allows employers to pay less in total 
compensation, then the repeal of the exclusion could make employees demand more cash 
wages, increasing employer costs, which might be borne by owners or customers of 
firms, and not employees, as the revenue-loss approach suggests.   
There are two levels at which we need to understand incidence in approaching 
tax reform.  First, the standard incidence question looks at real, economic incidence and 
not just nominal incidence.  Second, and most important for reformers contemplating 
legislative change, is who would be harmed by repeal.  The answer to these questions 
might be the same, but not necessarily.  And for some provisions, the answer to the first 
inquiry might be nobody if the market has completely competed away the benefit, 
making the second inquiry the only relevant one in deciding whether the repeal is good 
policy.  The second question is crucial in any reform that repeals tax expenditures 
because repeal may cause asset values to decline, producing losses for individuals.  
For example, the home mortgage interest deduction may have been completely 
competed away in the market long ago and capitalized into the price of housing.  In that 
case, the real beneficiaries of the deduction would be limited to those who owned homes 
at the time the provision was adopted because their home rose in value on the adoption 
and they paid a price that did not account for any anticipated tax deduction.  Even if the 
tax benefit has not been completely competed away, it is unlikely that the revenue loss, 
and the taxpayers to whom that revenue loss is attributed in the tax expenditure budget, 
accurately measures the benefits enjoyed by the provision now.  Repeal may create losers 
out of people who never enjoyed an unwarranted windfall.   
Before we reduce the tax benefits for mortgage interest, we should know who 
will suffer the greatest loss in home value on account of the change.  Loss in asset value 
is unlikely to be uniform across all taxpayers or all homes, and it may not be concentrated 
at the top of the income spectrum, even if the highest earners garner the greatest dollars 
of revenue loss from the deduction (as the Joint Committee’s distributional tables show).  
The mortgage interest deduction may be more fully capitalized into the price of moderate 
housing than expensive housing because rich people have houses that cannot be fully 
financed within the million dollar limit of § 163(h)(3).  If owners of more modest houses 
will see the largest percentage drop in the value of their homes from repeal of the 
deduction, policymakers should be aware of that.  Currently, there is no attempt to 
determine who would lose the most asset value on account of a change in the law, and 
therefore there is no consideration of such losses in the design of legislation.  This is an 
unfortunate lacuna in the tax reform discussion. 
 Eliminating tax expenditures today, without incidence data, would be a cynical 
gesture.  But Congress might find it politically irresistible for that reason.  It made a 
similar gesture in 1986 when it increased the corporate tax.  In 1986, the individual 
income tax—which is salient for individual taxpayers—was reduced. Simultaneously, the 
corporate tax—which is hidden from view of the individuals who bear the burden of it—
paid for that reduction.  Corporations are not human, so they cannot bear the burden of 
                                                                                                                                                 
$15 in costs.  Workers who have insurance on their spouse’s plan, for example, don’t receive even the $85 
value from the fringe benefit and would be better off with an even lesser amount of cash. 
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taxation.  Instead, individuals with relationships to corporations bear the real incidence of 
the corporate tax.  Unfortunately, there is no definitive determination of who that is, 
whether shareholders, employees, or consumers.  Reducing individual taxes and raising 
corporate taxes was a sleight of hand that made individuals believe that their taxes were 
reduced, even if their burden was not, because they paid for that reduction by bearing the 
burden of the increased corporate tax.   
It is possible that incidence data cannot be collected for some (many?) tax 
expenditures.  Economists, not lawyers, will need to carry out the formidable task this 
analysis demands.136  Nevertheless, the inability to compile real distributional incidence 
analyses would be relevant in deciding what to do about particular provisions.  If it is 
impossible to know the incidence for a particular tax or provision, then policymakers 
might want to reconsider implementing that provision.  The cynical approach to tax 
reform is to impose the tax whose incidence is unknown, in the hope that people will fail 
to notice it or believe it does not fall on them.  But the tax provision with unknown 
incidence is the one we should be wary of, and tax reform should make burdens and 
benefits from the tax system more, rather than less, transparent. 
3. Subsidies Should Be Distinguished From Incentives 
Connected to the question of incidence is the distinction between subsidies and 
incentives, a distinction that has never been clearly drawn in the discussion of tax 
expenditures.  A subsidy provides an economic benefit to a person or makes something 
cheaper for him, while an incentive induces a person to behave in a particular way.  It 
matters who gets the subsidy, but not who is incentivized.  In its comprehensive study of 
tax expenditures, the Joint Committee called its biggest category “tax subsidies,” but it 
described “social spending” in that category as either subsidizing or inducing behavior,137 
as though the distinction was not important.  This is a mistake.  For policymakers, it 
should matter whether a provision is a subsidy or an incentive because the measurement 
of a program’s success depends on the purpose it has.  If a provision is designed to 
provide a subsidy for particular people (like families with children) because Congress 
wanted to ensure they had sufficient resources, it is important that the market not shift the 
tax benefit to other people (who do not have children).  If Congress’s goal was instead to 
increase certain types of activity in the economy, market shifting of benefits would be 
less of a concern.  Thus, it is important to know whether a provision actually operates as 
a subsidy or as an incentive, and who is subsidized or incentivized, and the tax 
expenditure budget would be a more useful informational tool if it provided this 
information. 
An incentive for one taxpayer could operate as a subsidy for another.  Recall the 
example of the energy-saving windows in the last section and how the real incidence 
shifted, in part, from the consumer to the producer.  The tax expenditure in that example 
was an incentive for the consumer, but a subsidy for both the producer and the consumer.  
To continue with that example, consider the effects on incentives and subsidies if the 
                                                      
136 The Joint Committee on Taxation undertook a comprehensive analysis of how distribution 
tables should be compiled, analyzing all the relevant issues, including the definition of economic burden of 
tax, the framework for measuring burden, the time horizon for measuring, shifting of burdens in the market, 
and the distinction between burden and revenue collected.  Assumptions need to be made, even in the most 
rigorous approach.  See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 103D CONG., METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN 
MEASURING CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS (Joint Comm. Print 1993). 
137 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2008-2012, at 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2008). 
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price of the windows rose to $1,538.  In that case, there would be no subsidy for the 
consumer at all.  The consumer would claim a deduction of $1,538 for the cost of the 
windows, saving $538 in tax, and bear the same $1000 after-tax cost that she had prior to 
the adoption of the provision.  While the tax deduction might continue to operate to 
incentivize the behavior by making it appear advantageous, it really provides no benefit 
to the taxpayer.  For lower bracket taxpayers, the energy-saving windows tax expenditure 
could actually operate as a negative subsidy (i.e., a tax).  If a market adjustment fully 
captures the benefits at the 35% bracket level so that price rises to $1,538, a 25% bracket 
taxpayer has an after-tax cost of $1,154, $154 more than he would have paid if the tax 
law had never included the provision.  Of course, in this case, the lower-bracket taxpayer 
should not feel encouraged by the tax law to purchase these windows, but that assumes 
that he understands that the market has shifted the entire benefit away from him.   
Policymakers should be more concerned with understanding incidence for 
subsidies than for incentives because subsidies constitute value transfers to particular 
individuals or institutions.  If Congress wants to subsidize individuals, it should know 
whether the intended individuals receive the benefit, or whether they lose it to third 
parties in the market.  At the same time, policymakers must be concerned with the effects 
of incentives because that will indicate whether the law is successful in producing its 
intended goals for society.  Consider how these analyses are related by thinking about the 
education subsides in the Code.  Congress may want to provide a subsidy for education 
because students and their parents have a difficult time affording it and may suffer from 
devoting too many of their resources to it.  The subsidy would alleviate a financial burden 
on a needy group, reflecting a distributional policy judgment about students and their 
families.  If the price of education rises in response to the tax benefits,138 the subsidy 
objective is frustrated.  On the other hand, Congress may want to provide an incentive for 
education because the American population is too ignorant to produce the goods and 
services necessary for economic growth and prosperity.  If that is the goal, it may not 
matter which individuals get educated as long as a sufficient number do.  That policy 
does not have a distributional objective since it is not designed to provide benefits to 
identifiable people.  In that case, the incentive is enacted to produce a particular market 
effect that corrects for a market failure in which too few individuals are educated.  If 
more people become educated, the policy is a success, regardless of who enjoys the 
benefit of the foregone tax revenue.  If taxpayers perceive education to be cheaper on 
account of the tax credits (even if it was not), so enroll when they otherwise would not 
have, then the incentive is effective even though they are not subsidized.  Alternatively, if 
educational institutions provide better education because they have more resources per 
student, the policy goal of increasing the knowledge of the workforce may be 
accomplished.  So, the education provisions in the Code may be good policy, but it 
depends on what the policy is.  The distributional story reflects an equity concern, while 
the market failure story reflects an efficiency concern.  When government designs and 
                                                      
138 There is some concern that educational institutions may have captured the tax benefits by raising 
tuition, but there is little evidence of it.  See ELAINE MAAG, DAVID MUNDEL, LOIS RICE & KIM RUEBEN, TAX 
POL’Y CTR., SUBSIDIZING HIGHER EDUCATION THROUGH TAX AND SPENDING PROGRAMS (2007), available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311453_education.pdf.  While prices can change for many 
reasons, economists can sometimes identify correlations between prices and taxes when changes occur in the 
law.  For example, changes in rates of subsidy under the charitable contribution deduction have been 
correlated with changes in levels of giving.  See, e.g., JANE GRAVELLE & DONALD MARPLES, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R40518, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS: THE ITEMIZED DEDUCTION CAP AND OTHER FY2011 
BUDGET OPTIONS 4-8 (2010). 
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implements policies like the education credits, it should know whether the policy is a 
failure if the benefits do not reduce the cost for the nominal taxpayers, or if the same 
number of people engage in the activity regardless of the provision.  
The Joint Committee used the charitable contribution deduction as an example of 
a subsidy or incentive, without concern for which it is.139  It might be either, or both, and 
it matters which it is.  If the deduction is an incentive that causes donors to increase their 
gifts by at least as much as the tax benefit,140 it is an incentive to the donor and a subsidy 
to charity.  Policymakers might then want to tweak the provision to adjust the overall 
level of support for the work of charities.  The Bipartisan Policy Center’s design for the 
charitable credit reflects the assumption that the tax savings is an extra amount for the 
charity because it proposes that the government send matching grants to the charities.141  
But donors might not allow the charities to have the tax savings.  In the Bipartisan Policy 
Center’s scheme, taxpayers might reduce their contributions on account of the matching 
grant.   
Under current law, in which charitable gifts entitle donors to a deduction,142 
taxpayers might not increase their gifts on account of the tax benefits that they will 
receive.  They may have decided how much to give without regard to the tax 
consequences.  Many non-itemizers make gifts to charity, so it is clear that an incentive is 
not necessary to induce them to give.  If donors give exactly what they would have given 
without the deduction, then the deduction provides no incentive.  However, there is still a 
subsidy for itemizers who claim the charitable deduction because there is a reduction in 
tax on account of the gift.  But the incidence of the subsidy is on the donors themselves—
i.e., it rewards them for giving to charity.143  That might be desirable if public policy is to 
reward virtue, but it is more likely that policymakers would be dubious about the 
provision if the tax benefits subsidize donors rather than charitable organizations.   
Surrey’s upside-down subsidy critique of tax expenditure analysis assumes that 
the nominal claimant of the deduction is the beneficiary of the subsidy.  A subsidy for 
charitable donors, at their marginal rate of tax, means that the rich receive greater subsidy 
per dollar of donation than do the poor.  But if the organizations receive the subsidy 
(whether directly, as in the Bipartisan Policy Center’s proposal, or indirectly through the 
donor grossing up the gift), the tax rate of the donors is not relevant to the distributional 
analysis.  Rather, the beneficiaries of the charity are the relevant group in the 
distributional analysis.  If the organization receives the benefit of the subsidy, the extent 
to which the taxpayer increases his contribution is what matters.144  
                                                      
139 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008-2012, at 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2008). 
140 See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 
1404 (1988). 
141 See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 14, at 33-34. 
142 I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 2010). 
143 For example, if a taxpayer in the 30% bracket would give $100 to charity in the absence of a 
deduction, consider what he would do with the deduction.  If he increases his contribution to $143, then the 
deduction incentivizes him and subsidizes the charity because the after-tax cost to him is the same as before 
and the charity gets the tax benefits.  If he still gives $100, then the deduction is no incentive but subsidizes 
him because it reduces his after-tax cost of the gift to $70.   
144 The Code’s longstanding deduction for the fair market value for appreciated property has, 
during times of high tax rates, clearly operated as a subsidy to high-bracket donors, even if it also provided an 
incentive.  Consider high tax rates: If T paid tax at 70% and donated property worth $10,000 with a basis of 
$1,000, T is entitled to a $10,000 deduction worth $7,000 in tax savings and has no income to include.  
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The Fiscal Commission included a somewhat novel proposal for charitable 
contributions in the illustrative plan (the zero plan would abolish tax benefits for 
charitable giving).  It proposed a 12% nonrefundable credit, subject to a 2% adjusted 
gross income floor.145  This design limits two things about the charitable credit.  First, the 
value is uniform for all taxpayers, regardless of marginal rate.146  Second, a taxpayer’s 
first gifts are non-creditable because only amounts in excess of 2% of income would be 
eligible for the credit.  This is a high floor, and it reveals the Fiscal Commission’s 
assumption that the provision would operate as either an incentive or a subsidy for large 
gifts, but not for small gifts.  It suggests that taxpayers who give less than 2% of their 
adjusted gross income are either inelastic givers or do not give until it hurts, but that 
taxpayers either need a push (incentive) or deserve a reward (subsidy) if they give above 
that floor.147  If they are treating the provision as an incentive, then below the floor, the 
design of the provision presumes that the deduction is a subsidy for the taxpayer, so it is 
not desirable policy.   
B. Distributional Neutrality Is Not Distributive Justice 
The terms commonly used to describe the distributional effects of tax changes are 
misleading, and policymakers need a more precise understanding of the effects of trading 
tax expenditures for rate cuts.  A “distributionally neutral” change in the tax law is one in 
which tax shares do not change.  In other words, if the third quintile pays 10% of total tax 
prior to a change in the law, a distributionally neutral change would continue to collect 
10% of total tax from the third quintile.148  Total taxes may go up or down as part of the 
change, but if the share of taxes remains the same, the change is distributionally neutral.   
Distributional neutrality does not imply normative equality. First, a 
distributionally neutral change that significantly raises revenue might impose a 
disproportionate burden on low-income taxpayers, even if their tax shares remain the 
same.  This is standard welfare analysis: a dollar of tax is more burdensome to a low-
income taxpayer than a high-income taxpayer.  Consider X and Y.  X has $10 in income 
and Y has $100 in income.  Before the change, assume that X pays $1 and Y pays $15 in 
tax.  A distributionally neutral change that raises everyone’s taxes might take $4 from X 
and $56 from Y.149  This leaves X $6 and Y $44.  If subsistence requires $8, then X is 
much worse off after this change than is Y, even though the change is distributionally 
neutral.  As a result, distributional neutrality is not necessarily normatively neutral 
because such changes have effects on individuals at different income levels that must be 
                                                                                                                                                 
Selling the property would have produced a $9,000 taxable gain, which would have incurred a $6,300 tax 
liability, netting T only $3,700 on the sale.  T gets a substantial windfall—almost double the value—by 
giving the property to charity rather than realizing the gain.  Even with a preferential capital gains rate cutting 
the tax in half, the gift nets T more than the sale.  Gift: $7,000 tax savings.  Sale: $10,000 proceeds – $3,150 
tax = $6,850 cash.  Since tax savings is as good as cash to taxpayers with sufficient income, T has a $150 
windfall, even where the gain is taxed at half the rate of ordinary income. 
145 NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, supra note 12, at 31. 
146 It would not be available to non-taxpayers because it is not refundable.  This distinguishes the 
Bipartisan Policy Center’s provisions, which provide a matching grant to charities regardless of the donor’s 
tax situation. 
147 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that total donations would generally decline with a 
floor, but that the tax subsidy would decline by much more.  A floor retains the incentive to give above the 
floor.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4030, OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE TAX TREATMENT OF 
CHARITABLE GIVING 10 (2011). 
148 See Sullivan, supra note 88. 
149 This change holds X constant at 6.25% and Y at 93.75% of total tax paid, with $16 total before 
the change and $60 after (with tax liabilities rounded to nearest dollar).  This is what tax shares are about. 
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defended on fairness grounds.  Second, a distributionally neutral change redistributes 
within income categories, rather than across them.  For example, if X and Y each earn 
$100, a distributionally neutral change could increase X’s tax liability by $20 and reduce 
Y’s by the same $20.  There are individual winners and losers from distributional 
changes, but they occur within income cohorts.  For these reasons, distributional 
neutrality is not necessarily normatively neutral because such changes have effects on 
individuals within income levels that also must be defended on fairness grounds.   
Policymakers must look beyond distributional neutrality to establish equitable 
treatment of individuals.  From this perspective, it is important to know the 
characteristics of the individuals who bear the burdens of distributionally neutral changes 
to decide if the government is favoring particular choices that individuals make.  Do 
people with children receive benefits that are not available to those without?  Do two-
worker families receive benefits compared to one-worker households?  Are older people 
taxed less on their income?  More educated people?  People who live on the coasts or in 
cities?  These are all dimensions of difference among individuals and it is not “neutral” to 
move the tax burden among them as long as tax paid by individuals who happen to 
inhabit the same income quintile remains a constant share of taxes paid.  Instead, the tax 
reform debate must be more explicit about what characteristics are relevant to 
determining tax burdens.  A just government might reduce the tax burden on families 
with children as a way to alleviate the costs of children, but it should be explicit and 
purposeful in taxing them less than families without children.  Income is clearly part of 
the relevant measure, but not sufficient to determine a just tax.  Some tax expenditures 
are adjustments that Congress has used to distinguish taxpayers, and we must be careful 
that tax reform does not sacrifice any precision that has been honed in determining 
abilities to pay.  
Grouping by income in distributional analyses is also problematic when wealth 
might be a more relevant measure for fairness.  All the distributional analyses performed 
by the Joint Committee measure with reference to income, even when the tax at issue is 
levied on another base.150  For example, a sales tax is imposed on consumption, but the 
distributional analysis of a sales tax in the methodology used by the Joint Committee 
allocates the burden by income group as an implicit tax on earning.  It does the same 
thing for wealth taxes.151  This is helpful in comparing different types of taxes to one 
another because it gives a standard measure common to all of them.  But determining a 
just division of the benefits and burdens of government requires more than comparisons 
according to income.  Income is not an ultimate arbiter of difference along which all 
differences can be measured.  Particularly where we are looking at tax payments, 
consideration of wealth is as relevant as income.   
Distributionally neutral tax changes highlight the importance of the definition of 
income cohorts.  Given the increased income inequality that has developed over the last 
generation, we should be more discerning at the top.  There is a world of difference 
between the top 5% and the top 1%,152 and even the top tenth of 1%, so that any change 
                                                      
150 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 103D CONG., METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING 
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS 9 (Joint Comm. Print 1993). 
151 Id. at 10. 
152 In the Tax Policy Center’s analysis, the top 5% has an average income of $443,618, the top 1% 
has an average income of $2,262,666 and the top 0.1% has an average income of $9,870,712.  The breaks are 
as follows: top 5%, $270,410; top 1%, $701,245; and top 0.1%, $3,209,498. See TAX POL’Y CTR., 
28 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:1 
that increases the taxes of the top 1% while reducing the rest of the top 5% is not a 
distributionally neutral change; it is an important change in the level of progressivity 
given the background of income shares.  Distributional analyses must be sensitive to the 
levels at which income significantly changes a person’s options in life.  Quintiles are 
likely too wide at both the bottom and the top, but in the middle, they may be adequate.  
The Tax Policy Center’s analyses of the tax reform proposals currently on the table are 
significantly more sensitive to this problem than the government’s numbers,153 but 
nobody has tried to understand where income breaks really matter for well-being or 
ability to pay tax. 
Tax reformers must grapple with the fact that any reform will make certain 
individuals losers.  Taking the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and our history since its adoption 
as a model, we can expect a reintroduction of tax expenditures after wiping the slate clean 
in a major reform.154  If the return of tax expenditures is inevitable,155 then the costs to 
individuals of their repeal must be measured against the temporary efficiency gains their 
repeal will foster.  Reform must tolerate losses for some individuals as the price for 
greater overall gains.  But we cannot know whether increased efficiency is worth the cost 
if we are in the dark about precisely what the costs are, which individuals will bear them, 
and what the costs are buying.  The current discussion is incomplete in ignoring that these 
costs exist.  
C. The Distributional Effects of Tax Expenditures Have Changed 
While we are ignorant about so many aspects of tax expenditures, there are some 
things that we can be confident about.  One is that tax expenditures are different today 
than they were forty years ago, and they are widely available to people at all income 
levels.  Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, recently wrote in her annual report 
to Congress:  
There is a widespread belief that the influence of “special interests” is the 
biggest roadblock to comprehensive tax reform.  There is no doubt that 
many provisions in the tax code benefit narrow groups of taxpayers . . . . 
But the dirty little secret is that the largest special interests are us—the 
vast majority of U.S. taxpayers.  Virtually all of us benefit from certain 
exclusions from income, deductions from income, or tax credits 
(collectively known as “tax expenditures”).156   
Despite the broad enjoyment of tax expenditures, they continue to be burdened 
by the reputation that Surrey gave them.  He believed that tax expenditures were 
undeserved giveaways to high-income taxpayers.157  His project of identifying and 
measuring tax expenditures was inseparable from his idea that they should be repealed.  
                                                                                                                                                 
DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL TAX CHANGE BY CASH INCOME PERCENTILE, PROPOSAL IN 2022 EVALUATED AT 
2018 INCOME LEVELS, available at http://taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T10-0249.pdf. 
153 See TAX POL’Y CTR., supra note 87.  The Joint Committee’s 2010 distributional tables define the 
top category as $200,000 and up.  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL 
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at 48-54 (Joint Comm. Print 2010). 
154 See HUNGERFORD, supra note 6. 
155 Given the dynamic between lobbyists and Congress, they probably are.  See Richard L. 
Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?  Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891, 925 (1987) (offering a model of tax legislation that produces constant statutory 
change).  See also McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 101, at 1233-35. 
156 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 9 (2010). 
157 See SURREY, supra note 32, at 134-38. 
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Surrey’s tax expenditure budget was intended to increase their transparency by naming 
and quantifying them.  Consistent with Surrey’s preference for a more progressive, purer 
income tax, the earliest budgets included distributional information that showed tax 
expenditures primarily benefiting the rich by favoring income from capital as well as 
various personal expenditures.158  Tax expenditure reform was properly understood as 
part of the comprehensive income tax agenda of left-leaning reformers.159  
That story is more complex today.  The advent of refundability—disbursing 
federal money to individuals who owe no income tax—has dramatically expanded the 
potential reach of federal policy administered through the tax law, and tax expenditures 
now include crucial programs for the poor.  For decades, families with the lowest 
incomes were mostly left out of tax benefit largesse, but the recent growth of refundable 
provisions has changed that.160   
When the tax expenditure budget was first designed, there were no refundable 
provisions in the income tax.161  In 2010, there were five that provided transfers to 
individuals too poor to owe tax: the earned income tax credit,162 child credit,163 American 
Opportunity Tax credit,164 first-time homebuyer credit,165 and make work pay credit.166  
The 2008 distribution tables included in the Joint Committee’s budget167 show a subtle, 
but distributionally important, shift from the early versions.  While the mortgage interest 
deduction and the charitable contribution deduction still provide disproportionate benefits 
to high-income taxpayers, the distributional tables also include other tax expenditures that 
are more beneficial to low- and middle-income taxpayers.  The EITC is the starkest 
example: including the refundable portion of the credit, taxpayers with incomes below 
$20,000 enjoyed half the total dollar value of the credit, while taxpayers earning over 
$200,000 received none.168  The education credits and the student loan interest deduction 
similarly produced no benefit to taxpayers in the highest income category.  While very 
low-income individuals received scant benefit from those provisions, taxpayers with 
incomes below $75,000 enjoyed more than half the total dollar benefit of both those 
education subsidies.  
The effect of refundability (i.e., the amount of transfers in excess of tax liability) 
of the five provisions for 2010 was estimated to be $102.7 billion.169  While this number 
                                                      
158 See supra Part III.A.1. 
159 See Shaviro, supra note 130, at 201. 
160 The Joint Committee’s 2008 budget separated the refundable portion of tax expenditures from 
the nonrefundable portion and included a total of about $300 billion in transfers to the poor over the five-year 
window.  While significant, that total transfer to poor people is dwarfed by a single tax expenditure, the $680 
billion subsidy of employer-provided health insurance to tax-owing taxpayers.  Tax expenditures total over a 
trillion dollars annually.  See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008-2012, at 50, 56 (Joint Comm. Print 2008). 
161 The EITC was first adopted in 1975 as a temporary measure, and the maximum credit was 
$1,452.  See John Karl Scholz, Taxation and Poverty: 1960-2006, 25 FOCUS 52, 54 (2007). 
162 I.R.C. § 32 (West Supp. 2010). 
163.I.R.C. § 24 (West Supp. 2010). 
164 I.R.C. § 25A (West Supp. 2010). 
165 I.R.C. § 36 (West Supp. 2010) (expired April 30, 2010).  See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 
112TH CONG., LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS, 2010-2020, at 2 (Joint Comm. Print 2011). 
166 Id.; I.R.C. § 36A (West Supp. 2009) (expired 2010). 
167 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at 48-54 (Joint Comm. Print 2010). 
168 This is not a surprise, though it should be noted that the distribution tables use an expanded 
definition of income.  See id. at 49-54. 
169 See id. at 46, n.4. 
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is relatively small compared to the total tax expenditures for the year, it is substantial 
enough to have weight in the debate over tax expenditures, particularly from the 
perspective of total federal benefits for low-income Americans.  The latest numbers 
available are from 2008, but it is reasonable to expect that the distribution of tax 
expenditure benefits to low-income taxpayers will increase in the 2009 and 2010 
statistics.  In those years, the education credit was larger and refundable, the earned 
income credit was increased for taxpayers with three or more children, and the threshold 
for refundability of the child credit was lower.170   
At the same time that Congress has been adding more tax-based spending 
programs targeted to low-income taxpayers, it has limited various tax expenditures for 
high-income taxpayers by instituting income phaseouts and caps.171  The Code also 
includes provisions that claw back tax benefits from high income taxpayers,172 such as 
the alternative minimum tax173, the phaseout for personal exemptions174 and itemized 
deductions.175  The most recent budget includes a distribution table that shows a negative 
tax expenditure (i.e., a penalty) on account of the phaseout of personal exemptions for 
high-income taxpayers and those subject to the alternative minimum tax.  The table 
indicates that taxpayers earning over $200,000 incur about 90% of this tax penalty.176  
Other changes in the underlying tax base that increase tax expenditure benefits to lower 
income individuals include growth in above the line tax expenditures that can be enjoyed 
regardless of whether a taxpayer itemizes deductions.177  Low-income taxpayers rarely 
itemize deductions because those deductions must exceed the standard deduction for 
itemizing to be worthwhile.178 
In all, the latest tables show a substantially different distribution of tax 
expenditures than did the early tax expenditure budgets.  Today, some of the most 
progressive features of the tax law are tax expenditures.  Repealing all tax expenditures 
would mean ending the largest anti-poverty cash entitlement program.179  According to 
the Congressional Research Service, virtually all the federal support for housing, a 
majority of support for education, training, and employment, and a substantial amount for 
income security were provided through tax expenditures.180  These developments show 
that a subtle shift has taken place, and an attack on tax expenditures is no longer a rebuke 
solely to hidden largesse for the rich, as it may once have been.  This shift also indicates 
that tax reform that eliminates tax expenditures may have to be paired with new direct 
                                                      
170 These provisions have been extended through 2012.  Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization, Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 103, 124 Stat. 3296, 3299 (2010). 
171 E.g., I.R.C. § 25A (West Supp. 2010) (phaseout for education credits); I.R.C. § 24 (West Supp. 
2010) (phaseout for child credit); I.R.C. § 32 (West Supp. 2010) (phaseout for EITC). 
172 These may be understood as rate adjustments.  See infra Part V.C. 
173 I.R.C. § 54 (West Supp. 2009, I.R.C. § 56 (West Supp. 2010). 
174 I.R.C. § 151 (2006). 
175 I.R.C. § 68 (2006).  This phaseout is currently repealed through 2012.  Tax Relief Act of 2010, 
§ 101. 
176 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at 54 (Joint Comm. Print 2010). 
177 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(2), (17), (18), (19) (West Supp. 2010). 
178 For 2011, the standard deduction is $5,800 for single taxpayers and $11,600 for married 
taxpayers.  I.R.S. News Release IR-2010-127 (Dec. 23, 2010). 
179 CHRISTINE SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31768, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT: AN 
OVERVIEW 1 (2010). 
180 THOMAS HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33641, TAX EXPENDITURES: TRENDS AND 
CRITIQUES 14-16 (2008). 
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spending programs to replace the safety net that these tax provisions currently offer.  It 
might be good policy design to replace some of these programs with direct spending 
alternatives, but the total revenue savings from tax reform will be significantly less if tax 
expenditures are replaced with direct spending, than if they are simply repealed.181 
The extension of tax expenditures to provide greater benefits to lower income 
individuals has apparently made them more objectionable to more people, rather than 
more acceptable to Surrey’s successors.  The contemporary attack on tax expenditures 
comes from across the political spectrum,182  and tax expenditures currently reflect 
policies that run the gamut from increasing the international competitiveness of U.S. 
companies and encouraging business investment to alleviating the costs of children and 
making work pay for low-income wage-earners.  In short, there are tax expenditures for 
everyone to hate.  Nevertheless, it is bizarre to imagine that such a diverse set of 
provisions could be uniformly repugnant to so many people.  These diverse federal 
policies would never be lumped together and repealed if they did not share the 
administrative mechanism of the tax system.  The Fiscal Commission and Bipartisan 
Policy Center were significantly more reflective in considering cuts in direct spending 
than they were in considering cuts in tax-based spending. Congress must approach tax 
reform with the same attention to detail. 
IV. THE TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET CANNOT BEAR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFORM 
Any proposal to eliminate all tax expenditures puts more pressure on the 
definition of what constitutes a tax expenditure than it can bear. Until now, the tax 
expenditure budget has primarily been an informational tool.183  But the repeal of all tax 
expenditures makes that budget the litmus test for acceptable tax rules, a burden too 
heavy for an informational project.  Even prior to the current plans to remove all tax 
expenditures, the tax expenditure budget has been a hit list for lawmakers searching for 
revenue,184 and categorization as integral to the revenue-raising function has protected a 
provision from that search.185  To hang tax reform on an informational document elevates 
the purpose that the document serves, and as the stakes rise, there is likely to be even less 
consensus on the provisions to be included as tax expenditures. 
If provisions of the tax law are to be divided into tax expenditures, which are 
bad, and provisions that make up the necessary structure of the tax, which are good, then 
a sharp line between those categories must be drawn.  For example, a tax based on net 
                                                      
181 The total tax expenditure for the earned income tax credit for 2008-2012, including both the 
refundable and nonrefundable portions, was estimated to be $250 billion.  See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAX’N, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008-2012, at 50, 58 
(Joint Comm. Print 2008). 
182 On the right, see Martin Feldstein, The ‘Tax Expenditure’ Solution for Our National Debt, 
WALL ST. J., July 20, 2010; Bruce Bartlett, Spending Through The Tax Code, FORBES, May 28, 2010; N. 
Gregory Mankiw, The Blur Between Spending and Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at Bu5; on the left see 
Limiting Tax Expenditures Must Be Part of Congress’s Efforts to Balance the Budget, CITIZENS FOR TAX 
JUSTICE (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.ctj.org/pdf/taxexpenditures.pdf; JASON LEVITIS, NICHOLAS JOHNSON, & 
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OFFICE, GAO-11-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE POTENTIAL DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, 
SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE REVENUE (2011). 
183 See Sugin, supra note 98, at 413. 
184 Tax expenditures are often regarded as “payfors” in the budget process.  See Kleinbard, supra 
note 99, at 3. 
185 See Sugin, supra note 98, at 413-17. 
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income must include structural provisions that are necessary to measure net income 
accurately, such as a deduction for business expenses.  Without that deduction, the tax 
would be imposed on gross receipts, not net income.  But there are many provisions that 
are not as easily categorized as business expenses, like the treatment of the family and the 
separate corporate and individual income taxes.  Even within business expenses, some 
costs, such as business meals, are only partially connected to the production of income 
and partially connected to personal consumption, so their categorization as structural is 
not completely accurate.  The Treasury and Joint Committee have alternative approaches 
to accelerated depreciation, a business expense, and whether it should be treated as 
normal.  Despite decades of trying, nobody has been able to decisively draw the line 
between structural provisions and tax expenditures, and the topic continues to be 
contested today. The Joint Committee on Taxation and the Treasury Department each 
prepare a tax expenditure budget, and the items included in the two versions do not 
entirely overlap.186  As long as the government has been compiling the tax expenditure 
budget, critics have challenged the “normal” baseline against which it measures spending 
for a range of reasons. 187  Boris Bittker immediately found nothing normatively attractive 
about the normal tax.188  Others quibbled about which provisions should be treated as 
normal, even though they accepted the income-centric definition of normal that the early 
budgets adopted.189  Some suggested that all provisions in the Code should be evaluated 
like tax expenditures.190  There have always been provisions excluded from the list 
because they are administratively necessary, even where they provide benefits or 
incentives that might otherwise count as departures from the normal baseline, such as the 
realization rule.191 
In 1983, the Treasury staff challenged the baseline used in the earlier budgets 
with publication of its Special Analysis G.192  In that report, Surrey’s key insight about 
tax expenditures—that some tax provisions are equivalent to direct outlays—was 
tested.193  The report reduced the definition of tax expenditures to “tax subsidies,” which 
it defined as provisions that apply to a narrow class of taxpayers or transactions and are 
exceptions from general provisions.194  The result was a redefined baseline that stopped 
treating items as tax expenditures if they constituted elements “necessary to make the tax 
operational.”195  The most significant changes made to the Treasury baseline at that time 
                                                      
186 The Joint Committee analyzes the ways in which its estimates differ from Treasury’s, including 
some differences in the base and differences in calculations of the estimates.  See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAX’N, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at 19 (Joint 
Comm. Print 2010). 
187 See generally Clifton J. Fleming & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis 
and Its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437 (2008) (noting that despite numerous criticisms of 
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188 See Boris Bittker, A Comprehensive Tax Base As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 925, 931-934 (1967). 
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192 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 97. 
193 Id. at 3. 
194 Id. at 5. 
195 Id. at 3. 
2011] TAX EXPENDITURES, REFORM, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 33 
was treating accelerated depreciation and graduated rates for corporations as basic 
structural features of the tax law. 
The Treasury made additional changes to the definition of the baseline tax in 
2004.196  At that time, it stopped treating the preferential rates for capital gains and 
dividend as tax expenditures, even though they had been designated that way since the 
first budget was prepared in 1972 (in fact, in the first budget, the capital gains preference 
was the largest single item).  In changing the treatment, the administration explained that 
the double taxation of corporate income under a system with a separate corporate tax was 
being offset by the reduced taxation of capital gains and dividends, making the preference 
an integral part of that structure, rather than a tax expenditure that provided a special rate 
for income from particular sources.197  This was a major challenge to the reference law 
baseline from Special Analysis G, in which the Treasury had explicitly chosen to 
continue treating the capital gains preference as a tax expenditure.  The 2004 report 
included a table of negative tax expenditures (i.e., tax penalties) that treats the tax on 
corporate profits as a negative tax expenditure.198 The $25 billion negative number for 
that item dwarfed most other items in the budget.199   
Also in 2004, the Treasury budget included a small but important change in 
measuring the tax expenditure from accelerated depreciation under the normal tax.  In 
1983, the reference law baseline was adopted without any tax expenditure for accelerated 
depreciation, but the 2004 change replaced the prior benchmark of straight-line 
depreciation in the normal tax method with an inflation-adjusted economic 
depreciation.200  The revised estimates were much smaller than under the prior approach, 
and were negative in some years.  Although the Treasury’s explanation makes clear that 
the negative tax expenditures do not mean that the law provides slower depreciation than 
economic depreciation would prescribe, the obvious conclusion to draw from the tables is 
that depreciation is too slow and the tax law is penalizing those subject to it.  The 
explanation that the numbers are a product of cash-flow accounting201 is unlikely to be 
understood by most people interested in the tax expenditure budget.  That budget 
discontinued measuring the tax expenditure for depreciation under the old system, 
depriving readers of comparative data202 and minimizing the appearance of benefits to 
taxpayers investing in capital projects. 
During the last decade, Treasury has tweaked other aspects of the tax expenditure 
budget and its analysis as well.  For example, in 2006, it started including imputed 
income from home ownership as a tax expenditure.203  In 2005, Treasury included a 
discussion of tax expenditures compared to regulation, as well as direct spending,204 
                                                      
196 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 123.  I critiqued these changes more fully in Linda 
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enlarging the discourse from the Joint Committee’s more rigid approach that considered 
direct spending as the paradigm against which tax expenditures should be determined.205   
In recent years, critics favoring a move to consumption taxation have challenged 
the income-centric approach that continues to inform the tax expenditure budgets 
today.206  In that vein, a more fundamental challenge to tax expenditure analysis was 
presented in the Treasury’s appendices, starting in 2004.207  In that report, Treasury 
included an analysis of tax expenditures in a consumption tax, reviewing its traditional 
list under a consumption tax model.208  It deemed some provisions to be tax expenditures 
under both approaches, others not to be tax expenditures under a consumption tax and a 
remaining few to be debatable.  The analysis called into question the propriety of 
including many provisions in the budget, but did not offer a comprehensive alternative 
pursuant to the alternative baselines.209 
The most recent development in the debate over the tax expenditure baseline was 
the Joint Committee’s Reconsideration report.210  Concerned that disagreement over the 
underlying conception that supported the tax expenditure budget undermined the integrity 
of the budget produced, the Joint Committee presented a new approach to tax 
expenditures that treated the tax law as moderately coherent to determine which 
provisions are included in the budget.  Its first (and only) budget using the new 
methodology was released a few months later.  The Reconsideration report was a 
comprehensive project, and it offered a new taxonomy and a new baseline that was 
designed to be devoid of any normative content.  In fact, it dispensed with the notion of a 
single, coherent baseline altogether.  Rather than compile the budget by asking which 
provisions in the Code are exceptions from an extrinsic and idealized normal tax as 
Surrey and the Joint Committee had traditionally done, the new methodology generated 
the budget by extrapolating from the tax law itself.  A new category of “Tax Subsidies” 
was generated by reference to discernible general rules of current law; the general rules 
thereby became a new baseline.211  The Joint Committee did not explain how it decided 
which provisions constitute the general rules, and there is no clear principle that the 
report adopted that would provide predictability and consistency.212  Inferring from the 
first budget implementing the report, general rules are those that have been around a long 
time, have broad sweep, and do not create structural distortions.213  The general rules are 
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not unlike the normal baseline used in the old analysis, so the tax expenditure budget 
under the reconsidered approach resembled prior versions. 
Regardless of the merits of these numerous critiques of—and changes to—the 
normal baseline that forms the basis of the tax expenditure budget, they do indicate that 
there has not been consistent support for a single baseline among important 
constituencies in Congress, the Treasury Department, and the larger tax community.  The 
changes that have been made to both the official tax expenditure budgets reveal the 
malleability of the baseline and its unavoidable politicization.  Consequently, any project 
to use that baseline as the model for tax reform stands on shaky ground.  More 
importantly, these developments show that there is little normative power in the baseline 
today.  Enacting tax reform that carries out such a baseline would lack a coherent 
conception of distributive justice, an important foundation for any tax system. 
V. REFORMERS PRIVILEGE EFFICIENCY OVER EQUITY 
Tax reform that eliminates tax expenditures from the Code favors efficiency over 
equity.  Efficiency improves both because tax expenditures distort taxpayer choice among 
activities and investments, and because removing tax expenditures broadens the base and 
allows rates to be reduced.  Replacing tax expenditures with rate cuts reduces the tax 
law’s interference in market transactions.  It is a deceptively attractive solution to our 
fiscal problems because we can see the cut in rates that we enjoy, but the benefits and 
burdens of tax expenditure repeal are less transparent.214 
The sacrifice of equity for efficiency is not new with these recent deficit 
reduction proposals.  There has long been a trend toward treating efficiency as the prime 
normative goal of tax policy.215  Efficiency seems more precise, has a clear direction and 
presents itself as a mathematically pure objective.216  Though lip service is often paid to 
equity, the heart of tax reform has been increasingly about efficiency.  The Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 is a good example.  In that paradigm of tax reform, statutory rates were cut, 
and incentives to engage in investments solely for tax savings were removed from the 
law.217  It had been wasteful for the tax law to encourage investors to build empty 
shopping centers and office buildings all over America. Nevertheless, there were winners 
and losers in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and policymakers need to be concerned with 
fairness to the individuals who are affected by reform.   
Both the Fiscal Commission proposal and the Bipartisan Policy Center proposal 
follow this model, trading tax expenditures for rate cuts.  In fact, the insistence on rate 
cuts reveals a greater interest in increasing efficiency than in deficit reduction, the 
ostensible goal of the project.  The Fiscal Commission’s recommendation to cap revenue 
at 21% of GDP218 was also extraneous to the task of deficit reduction, but revealing as to 
the real objective of the reform.  Although the Bipartisan Policy Center included a 
“national debt reduction sales tax”219 as a way to address the revenue concern, like the 
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Fiscal Commission, it largely seized this moment of opportunity for tax reform to 
primarily make the system more efficient.  It described its proposed tax as “simple, pro-
growth.”220  
A. Taxes Are Bad For Growth 
Efficiency as a goal is a normative choice that has never been fully justified for 
tax policy.  It embodies an unreflective belief that economic growth is good and that 
market results are just.  Only on the fringes of tax policy does anyone question this 
belief.221  While market defenders argue to banish distributional concerns from economic 
regulation, leading welfarists believe that the tax system is the proper place for such 
concerns.222  Economic regulation has generally eschewed distributional concerns in 
favor of growth,223 which is a sensible approach only as long as the distributional issues 
are better handled by an institution designed to handle them well—like the tax system.  If 
economic regulation is designed to maximize growth and the tax system is designed to 
maximize growth, there is precious little opportunity to focus on distribution.  
Nevertheless, there is a growing interest in the real world in designing taxation for 
growth.  In the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal, Daniel Henninger recently 
argued that the primary purpose of taxation should be promoting economic growth.224   
Unfortunately, growth is an incoherent standard for a tax system. By definition, 
taxation produces “excess burden” or “deadweight loss,” which is an efficiency cost that 
arises as a by-product of moving resources from private hands to public coffers.225  Any 
attempt to avoid a tax creates an efficiency loss.  Taxation always reduces the net 
individual rewards from economic activity and thereby burdens that activity.  The only 
way to avoid excess burden is through lump-sum taxation, such as a head tax that is fixed 
regardless of economic activity.226  Every tax system actually in use impedes growth in 
some way, so a growth norm favors repeal of every existing tax.  Income taxes reduce the 
gains from earning income, so repealing an income tax would promote more work and 
investment, and consequently growth.  Consumption taxes deter consumption, so 
repealing a consumption tax would promote demand, and consequently growth.  Wealth 
taxes reduce the accumulation of wealth, so repealing a wealth tax would better promote 
savings, and consequently growth.  Tax policy for growth is best achieved without taxes 
at all, so growth is an inapt norm for tax reform. 
Tax expenditures are purposely inefficient.  They are adopted precisely because 
they encourage individuals and businesses to engage in activities they would not 
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undertake in the absence of tax inducement, the very definition of an inefficient tax 
provision.  It is not surprising that economists are predisposed against them,227  but it is 
curious that they are criticized on account of that inefficiency.  The normative goal of an 
efficient tax is at odds with the normative goals of a tax containing special incentives and 
preferences, and an inefficient tax is only bad public policy if the appropriate norm is 
efficiency.  If Congress has national security reasons for discouraging dependence on 
fossil fuels, for example, it is reasonable for it to incentivize the development of 
alternative power sources, even though such incentives distort the market.  If Congress 
believes that two families with the same income have different taxpaying abilities if one 
family has children in college, it might reduce tax in connection with the costs of college, 
even though that distorts the market for education.   
Government creates costs in the course of achieving public policies unrelated to 
revenue collection, and we generally know to consider the benefits to be gained through 
those policies and balance them against the costs.  Discussions of tax reform seem to 
have forgotten that the inefficiencies produced by tax expenditures might be outweighed 
by their beneficial effects on other values, such as the distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of government.  The problem is broadly endemic in all discussions of tax reform, 
but particularly prominent in the debate about tax expenditures.  The tax law is as 
complex as it is because, at its best, Congress has attempted to make distinctions among 
taxpayers.  These distinctions may be inefficient, but they are not necessarily bad.  
B. Efficiency is the New Normal in the Tax Expenditure Baseline 
The most important recent analysis of tax expenditures adopted the efficiency-
first perspective.  In 2008, the Joint Committee on Taxation did a comprehensive 
investigation of the analysis used to consider tax expenditures228 and designed a new 
approach for identifying tax expenditures that chose efficiency as its unstated normative 
framework.  The Joint Committee’s discussion adopted the economist’s perspective that 
tax expenditures are presumptively illegitimate because inefficient, 229  and accepted 
welfare economics as the criteria for analysis.230 By adopting a welfarist paradigm in 
discussing tax expenditures, which are inherently inefficient, the report demanded that 
equity benefits overcome efficiency detriments to maximize welfare overall.231  In 
addition, in applying the new approach, the Joint Committee stated that “efficiency is an 
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inherently more neutral construct than is equity”232 in a project in which neutrality was 
the stated goal.233 
In the report, the Joint Committee created a new category of tax provisions, 
which it called “tax-induced structural distortions,” that had not existed in prior tax 
expenditure budgets. It described tax-induced structural distortions as general rules of the 
Code that “materially affect economic decisions in a manner that imposes substantial 
economic efficiency costs.”234  By using efficiency costs as the standard, the definition 
for tax-induced structural distortions makes an efficient tax the hypothetical alternative 
baseline, replacing the traditional normal (income) tax base that Surrey had designed in 
compiling the early tax expenditure budgets.  In this revised approach, only efficiency 
matters.  Equity concerns for tax-induced structural distortions were completely absent 
from the Joint Committee’s analysis.  The Joint Committee defended its choice of 
efficiency as the sole criterion for analyzing tax-induced structural distortions because it 
concluded that only its category of “tax subsidies” raises equity issues.  It defined tax 
subsidies as provisions that are “deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule 
of the present tax law . . . and that collect[] less revenue than does the general rule.”235  
The report distinguished the normative framework for tax subsidies from that applicable 
to tax-induced structural distortions by concluding that the latter are mostly about 
taxation of capital income where “efficiency goals loom largest.”236   
Applying efficiency as the normative standard is inadequate for tax-induced 
structural distortions and any other tax provision.  Contrary to the Joint Committee’s 
conclusion, the taxation of capital income presents one of the most important equity 
issues in the tax system; full taxation of capital income would significantly increase the 
share of taxes paid by the rich.  Both tax reform proposals include capital gains and 
dividends as ordinary income because that treatment is crucial to the overall progressivity 
of the plans.  The Joint Committee offers the distinction between debt and equity as an 
example of a tax-induced structural distortion.237  From an efficiency perspective, the law 
should be consistent in their tax treatment, whether we tax them both in full (or double) 
or exempt them both from tax.  However, from an equity standpoint, it may make a big 
difference whether we tax them both in full (or double) or exempt them both from tax 
because the rich and poor are likely to be affected differently, and individuals have 
different consequences depending on their holdings. 
At the other end of the spectrum, if efficiency is neutral and neutrality is the goal 
in designing taxation, we should expect that norm to spill over into all categories of tax 
provisions, even those that are designed to address distributional issues.  And in fact, the 
Joint Committee’s report was concerned with efficiency in the tax subsidy category.  For 
example, the report noted that there is a connection between the refundable provisions 
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(like the EITC and child credit) and income distribution, but it was primarily concerned 
with targeting and incentives,238 both of which are efficiency concerns.239 
C. Tax Expenditures Affect the Fairness of the Tax Rates 
The privileging of efficiency over equity constricts the analysis of tax 
expenditures to focus too narrowly on the definition of the tax base.  Tax expenditures, 
along with rates and exemptions, must be part of a discussion of overall tax progressivity.  
In a debate about tax fairness, the effects of tax expenditures on relative burdens must be 
made apparent.  Redistributive tax expenditures reflect other concepts of justice that 
might not be wealth-maximizing, but deserve serious consideration as public policy 
goals.  For example, the earned income tax credit may be best understood as a basic 
guaranteed minimum for productive members of society,240 the education credits may be 
best understood as providing equal opportunity for economic success, 241  and the 
exclusion for health insurance may be best understood as an elevated public value in 
bodily integrity that is more important than protecting individual property interests.  
These provisions may also produce positive economic effects, but even if they do not, 
they might be good public policy. 
In addition, some tax expenditures may be best understood as a legitimate part of 
the rate structure, rather than as a problem in the tax base.  Rates are uniformly treated as 
part of the general rules of the Code, so that the existing rate schedule at any time is part 
of those rules and never a tax expenditure.242  Therefore, rate changes over time would 
never appear in the tax expenditure budget.  Rates are about individuals and their 
burdens, so they need to be evaluated on those terms. The efficiency norm is inapt as 
applied to decisions about the effective rates of tax that individuals bear.  Efficiency may 
be relevant to setting marginal rates,243 but policymakers must set effective rates as well 
as marginal rates.   
This may be the best way to conceptualize the role of the earned income tax 
credit in the system overall, since it allows the lowest-income workers to enjoy a negative 
rate of tax.  Similarly, the child tax credit may be about adjusting burdens on families 
with children.  The negative tax expenditures that have recently appeared in the tax 
expenditure budgets may also be best understood as part of the structure of distributing 
burdens to individuals.  These negative tax expenditures include the phaseout of the 
personal exemption and the double taxation of corporate income.  Designating the 
phaseout of the personal exemption as a negative tax expenditure in the budget, as the 
Joint Committee did in its report,244 suggests that high-income taxpayers subject to that 
phaseout are being overtaxed.  But that phaseout could be understood instead as part of 
the rate structure, as the Joint Committee treated the personal exemption and standard 
deduction as zero-bracket amounts.245  If rates are outside tax expenditure analysis, as this 
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approach suggests, and the personal exemption is a matter of rates, then its reduction is 
not a negative tax subsidy, but an increase in rates.  While that rate increase may be 
hidden from public scrutiny by its design as an exemption phaseout, it is still essentially a 
rate adjustment.  Because tax expenditure analysis treats rates as distinguished from the 
base, it is important to properly identify rate elements and base elements.  Reduced rates 
on particular investments are subsidies to those investments, but increased rates to 
particular individuals are simply rates.  The phaseout of exemptions is about burdens on 
individuals on account of their total income, so it should be treated as part of the rate 
structure, where fairness controls.  
VI. REFORM MUST HEED THE LESSON OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 
Repealing all tax expenditures misunderstands the demands of tax expenditure 
analysis—that policymakers consider each tax expenditure to decide whether the policy 
is desirable and whether the mechanism is the best one for carrying out that policy.246  
Surrey’s key insight—that spending through the tax code is the same as direct 
spending—has gained widespread acceptance, even among those who might prefer to see 
these provisions as simple tax cuts.247  Lawmakers who frame their favorite policies as 
tax provisions clearly understand the equivalence, and the academic literature generally 
treats it as a fact.248  Tax expenditure analysis has been singularly powerful in providing 
reasoning to critics of tax incentives across the political spectrum; such critics regularly 
argue that tax expenditures should be subject to the same scrutiny as direct expenditures, 
if not repealed.249  
The Fiscal Commission Report is inconsistent in its adoption of tax expenditure 
analysis.  While it identifies tax expenditures as spending, it fails to subject them to the 
standards for spending reductions that it applies to direct spending in the rest of the 
report, contrary to the central lesson of tax expenditure analysis.  Undifferentiated repeal 
of tax expenditures fails to do the rigorous work that Surrey’s key insight demands.  The 
Commission engages in a much more thoughtful and measured approach to cutting 
discretionary spending and entitlement spending than it does for tax-based spending.  
Instead, the report seeks to eliminate spending through the tax law simply because it is 
administered through the tax law.  This is not a consistent or principled approach to 
cutting spending and it misunderstands what tax expenditure analysis demands. 
If we are to take the lessons of tax expenditure analysis to heart and analyze tax 
expenditures on the same terms as direct spending, we need to understand that repealing 
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tax expenditures will not produce the $1 trillion in revenue that tax expenditures currently 
cost.  This is true for a variety of reasons.  First, a tax expenditure may carry out a policy 
that Congress will want to replace with a direct spending program.  Second, the revenue 
cost of tax expenditures cannot be added up to produce a total revenue loss (or 
recoupment) because tax expenditures may interact in a way that misstates total revenue 
loss when aggregated.250  Third, scoring of tax expenditures may be mistaken because of 
projected behavioral effects.  Fourth, tax expenditures in the form of exclusions and 
deductions are dependent on tax rates, which would be lower in a Code without any tax 
expenditures. 
Tax expenditures differ from each other because they reflect different spending 
policies, and consequently cannot be treated as monolithic.  Rather than repealing all tax 
expenditures, it might be helpful to categorize tax expenditures along the lines of the 
following four categories: (1) modifications to the base that reflect reasonable differences 
about the ideal baseline, such as provisions that make the system more consumption-tax 
like and less income-tax like; (2) provisions that correct market failures or cognitive 
biases of taxpayers; (3) giveaways to powerful interests and special constituents; and (4) 
provisions that adjust levels of disposable real income of individuals.  Each statutory 
provision demands categorization and then analysis on its own terms.  Only the 
provisions in Category 3 are clear candidates for quick repeal.   
Category 1 may be the least appropriate to place on the reform chopping block 
because these provisions most closely resemble the ones that we treat as integral to the 
tax system. 251   These are provisions that make the tax system a hybrid income-
consumption tax, and they are in the Code because there is no consensus on an ideal tax 
base.  The baseline in the tax expenditure budget does not represent an ideal to achieve, 
but rather a reference for information.  The provisions in the Code that provide tax 
benefits to retirement savings, such as 401(k) plans and Roth IRAs, as well as the 
deductions for capital investment, 252  fit into this category.  While they may be 
characterized as tax expenditures, their function in the law is to modulate the income 
base.  There is no shortage of debate on what the best tax base is, and calling these 
provisions tax expenditures and repealing them on that ground ignores the much more 
substantive discussion of this issue taking place in the academic literature.253   
Elimination of the provisions that fall in Category 2 could undermine the growth 
goals that are so prevalent in the debate about tax reform today.254  These provisions are 
designed to improve efficiency, so they should be welcomed by the tax reformers who 
care most about growth and efficiency.  For example, tax benefits for development of 
alternative energies fall in this category.  Individuals fail to account for the environmental 
and political costs of fossil fuels, but alternative energy is too expensive to compete with 
the artificially low price of fossil fuels.  Tax benefits for alternative energies alter the 
market price to make such energies more competitive.  Correcting market failures 
improves efficiency, so provisions that fall into this category should not be repealed in 
the quest for efficiency. 
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Category 4 includes all the provisions that adjust for taxpaying ability along any 
dimension.  It includes credits for earners,255 child-related breaks of all kinds,256 special 
provisions for the elderly and blind,257 state and local taxes,258 medical expenses,259 and 
perhaps charitable contributions.260  Evaluating these provisions requires a political-
philosophical discussion about what each provision does and how it fits into the social 
fabric.  Some of this discussion has been taking place in the academic literature, but not 
in the current discussion of tax expenditure repeal and reform.  Child tax benefits, for 
example, reveal ideas about family and community.261  Payments per child, like the child 
tax credit,262 reflect the notion that families with children have less ability to pay tax and 
that children are entitled to support from other members of society beside their parents.  
These are the provisions that affect the core concerns of tax policy—what individuals and 
society owe to each other.  These are the provisions that give meaning to who is rich and 
who is poor in our society, and they are crucial to have as part of the tax system. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article is a challenge to those who would take the quick route to tax reform 
by repealing all tax expenditures.  It argues that tax expenditures do not share enough 
characteristics to warrant common treatment, and those who would repeal them all have 
failed to understand the role they play in federal policy.  The movement towards tax 
reform primarily for growth and efficiency is inconsistent with the demands of tax policy.  
The most distinctive role for tax policy is in distributive justice, and tax expenditures are 
a crucial mechanism for achieving fairness in the allocation of government benefits and 
burdens among individuals.  This article calls for recognizing tax expenditures as the 
important distributive tool that they are, and demands greater understanding of the role of 
tax expenditures in achieving fairness.  The debate on tax reform needs to be informed by 
a richer understanding and much more data than we have today about what tax 
expenditures do, who benefits from them, and who would bear the inevitable losses that 
would result from their repeal.  
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